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When no presidential candidate wins a majority in the Electoral College, 
the House of Representatives holds a "contingent election" between the top 
three candidates. Unfortunately, if one of those three candidates should die, 
there is no way to provide a substitute, so the dead candidate's supporters and 
party would be disenfranchised. 
Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment, ratified in 1933, addresses this situ-
ation; it authorizes Congress to legislate a process for substituting a new candi-
date. But for eighty-three years Congress (along with scholars) has never 
seriously considered Section 4, let alone passed legislation under it. This neglect 
has fostered a dangerous gap in the presidential electoral system. At every other 
stage in the process, dead candidates can be replaced; only here can a death 
eliminate an entire party from consideration in the election. 
While we could wait for an actual case before passing a Section 4 law, 
actual cases present too high a chance of a political impasse, yielding either 
inaction or suboptimal legislation. Moreover, without a Section 4 law on the 
books, the possibility of eliminating an entire party from consideration would 
loom as an unacceptable incentive-and prize-for would-be assassins any time 
there is a contingent election. To head off these risks, it would be prudent to pass 
a Section 4 law now. 
Part I of this Article provides context and background on Section 4 of the 
Twentieth Amendment. Part II, after considering what Congress should provide 
if it ever enacts Section 4 legislation, proposes draft legislation. Part Ill briefly 
considers why Congress has failed for so long to use its Section 4 power. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the most dramatic presidential election ever: Williams vs. 
Miller vs. Garcia. Garcia runs a strong third-party candidacy, so when the 
dust settles the day after the election no candidate appears to have a majority 
in the Electoral College. The country waits with bated breath for the new 
Congress to confirm the indecisive result on January 6 and then, pursuant to 
the Constitution's procedures, to choose a president in the House and a vice 
president in the Senate. 1 
In mid-December, disaster strikes as an assassin kills Garcia in an at-
tempt to knock him and his party out of the House's runoff election. Pande-
monium erupts. Before Garcia is even buried, Williams's and Miller's 
partisans start fighting, wheeling, and dealing to win Garcia's supporters in 
the House-who include several newly elected representatives and dozens 
more whose districts strongly favored Garcia in the election-over to their 
respective sides. 
Garcia's supporters feel disenfranchised. Surely there must be a way for 
them to continue to support Garcia and his movement, while opposing Wil-
liams and Miller. But how? Vote for a dead man? Replace Garcia in the 
House runoff with his running mate or another replacement candidate? Or 
are they just out of luck, meaning that the assassin's goal will be fulfilled? 
Because the Constitution provides no way to replace a dead candidate 
in the House runoff, that last result starts looking like the most likely one. 
Every politico and pundit across the country debates how to handle this, but 
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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no consensus emerges. The stakes are simply too high for Williams or Miller 
to do anything that might allow Garcia's supporters to field a new candidate. 
The obligatory flood of litigation settles nothing either. 
Adding to the drama is a stunning irony. Section 4 of the Twentieth 
Amendment, ratified in 1933, states: 
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of 
the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a Presi-
dent whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for 
the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may 
choose a vice president whenever the right of choice shall have devolved 
upon them. 2 
In an act of unprecedented proactivity, the drafters of the Twentieth 
Amendment empowered Congress to solve the precise problem of dead pres-
idential-runoff candidates. But in all the years since 1933, Congress has 
never even come close to using its Section 4 power to provide for candidate 
substitutions. Congress's failure gave Garcia's assassin a powerful incentive 
to act, transforming this deadlocked election from a drama into a crisis. 
Section 4 is helpful in one respect: it makes clear that the proper mech-
anism for resolving this mess is legislation (as opposed to, say, a House 
rule). Unfortunately, legislation requires consensus among the House, Sen-
ate, and president, and such consensus is in predictably short supply in the 
midst of the deadlocked presidential election and the transition to a new 
congressional term. Eventually there will be a final result-either Williams 
or Miller almost certainly will be the next president-but the process looks 
unlikely to be quick, fair-minded, or sensible. Worst of all, the assassin looks 
to have gotten his way. 
*** 
This Article considers the striking contradiction that is Section 4 of the 
Twentieth Amendment. On one hand, Section 4 represents congressional 
vigor, working to resolve a potential problem before it ever erupted into a 
very real one. On the other hand, the eight decades of inaction following 
Section 4's enactment stand as a shining beacon of congressional feckless-
ness.3 If a presidential election is ever deadlocked, and one of the candidates 
dies (even from natural causes), Congress's failure here will have produced 
needless turmoil. 
Part II of this Article provides the background behind Section 4. This 
includes examinations of the relevant constitutional provisions for dead-
locked elections, of the three elections in which the Electoral College failed 
to produce a winner, and of the two elections in which a candidate died. This 
background was both thin and distant at the time of Section 4' s genesis, but 
they show that the risks here are real; Part II continues with Section 4's 
2 Id. amend. XX, § 4. 
3 Section 4 has been largely ignored by scholars as well. 
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unusual legislative history, showing how Congress engaged a problem that 
was purely hypothetical. 
Part III considers the type of Section 4 legislation Congress should en-
act. In other words, what is the best way to handle the death of a candidate in 
a presidential election thrown into the House, or in a vice-presidential elec-
tion thrown into the Senate? After considering multiple options, Part III con-
cludes that the best one for most cases will be for a dead presidential 
candidate in the House to be replaced by his or her running mate, and for a 
dead vice-presidential candidate in the Senate to be replaced by a new party 
nominee. After this discussion, Part III considers a number of special cases 
and other issues, before concluding with a draft of proposed legislation. 
Part IV briefly considers why Congress has failed for three generations 
to use its Section 4 power. The principal reason is that Section 4's creation 
was motivated by unusual sentiments. That spirit had faded by the time Sec-
tion 4 was actually ratified, and has only grown fainter since. 
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
Section 4 confronts the possibility of a contingent election (the term 
that this Article will use for a presidential election thrown into the House, or 
a vice-presidential election thrown into the Senate) in which a candidate 
dies. There has never been a situation like this. There have been contingent 
elections, and there have been candidate deaths, but never a combination of 
the two. 
A. Contingent Elections 
The Constitution provides that if nobody wins a majority of the electo-
ral votes for president, the House of Representatives chooses the president 
from the top three electoral-vote recipients.4 Each state delegation gets one 
vote, and a "majority of all the states" is necessary for victory.5 For a vice-
presidential deadlock, the Senate makes the choice from those candidates 
getting the top two numbers of electoral votes. 6 Each senator gets one vote 
and a "majority of the whole number of Senators" is necessary for victory.7 
4 Id. amend. XII. The most comprehensive article on the nuts and bolts and potential 
complications of contingent elections is William Josephson, Senate Election of the Vice Presi-
dent and House of Representatives Election of the President, 11 U. PA. 1. CONST. L. 597 
(2009). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
6 Id. The use of "numbers" instead of "persons" in the vice presidential provision may 
affect the handling of ties. See infra note 27. 
7 U.S. CoNST. amend. XII. Another distinction between the House and Senate procedures 
is that the Constitution specifies that the House make its choice "immediately, by ballot," but 
makes no such specification for the Senate and its choice. Id. 
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There are four principal ways that a contingent election could arise: 8 
I. Two candidates could tie with exactly half of the electoral votes 
available (currently 269 out of 538). In a presidential election, the House 
would then choose from those two candidates rather than from three. A tie 
has occurred once, under the very different rules used before 1804.9 
2. Three or more candidates could receive electoral votes, with all can-
didates falling short of a majority. This has happened once, 10 and happened 
in the fictional scenario that opened this Article. 
3. A non-candidate might receive enough electoral votes from "faith-
less electors" (members of the Electoral College who vote for someone 
other than to whom they were pledged) to deprive the apparent winner of a 
majority. This occurred once. 11 
4. A state might fail to award electoral votes to anybody, such that 
neither candidate can get to 270 electoral votes. This has never happened. 12 It 
is possible in such a situation that Congress would decide against counting 
the missing votes in the denominator, in which case someone would be able 
to get a majority as long as there was not a tie or a strong-enough third-party 
candidate. 13 
8 The first three of these four ways are listed in THOMAS H. NEALE, CoNG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40504, CONTINGENT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BY CON-
GRESS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 4 (2009). 
9 See infra Section II.A. I (discussing Election of 1800). It is also possible that two candi-
dates could be short of a majority without tying, for instance if some electors abstained or cast 
votes for non-qualified candidates. 
10 See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing Election of 1824). 
11 See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing Election of 1836); see also infra note 170 (describ-
ing near miss in Election of 1960). More recently, in the last ten elections, there have been 
faithless electors in four: 2004 (a presidential vote for John Edwards instead of John Kerry), 
2000 (an abstention by one of Al Gore and Joe Lieberman's electors), 1988 (a presidential vote 
for Lloyd Bentsen and a vice presidential vote for Michael Dukakis instead of vice versa), and 
1976 (a presidential vote for Ronald Reagan instead of Gerald Ford). See ROBERT WILLIAM 
BENNETr, TAMING THE ELECrORAL COLLEGE 96, 225 n.6 (2006). 
12 Some people worried about this happening in 2000 because of the dispute between 
candidates Bush and Gore over recounting Florida's vote, but the Supreme Court's resolution 
of the dispute put a heavy emphasis on obtaining a timely result. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
98, 110 (2000). 
13 See David Goldiner, Twilight Zone Time for U.S.?, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 11, 2000, at 
6 (discussing this possibility in the context of the 2000 election). It makes sense not to count a 
missing state in the denominator, given that the Twelfth Amendment requires a majority of 
"the whole number of Electors appointed" and not the "whole number of Electors that would 
have been appointed if the states had all gotten their acts together." U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 
see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SEss. 669 (1865) (not counting missing Confederate 
states in the denominator when counting electoral votes from the Election of 1864, though 
President Lincoln would have had a majority in either case). But the legitimacy of the election 
would be imperiled if the number of missing electoral votes were too high and not counting 
them would change the outcome. In any case, if a state could not resolve a disputed vote count 
in time, it might prefer to send along two slates of electors and Jet Congress decide which to 
count rather than throw the whole election to the House. 
Abstentions by electors such as in 2000 are another matter-the elector having been ap-
pointed, she counts in the denominator-and thus could deprive an apparent winner of a ma-
jority. See supra note 9. 
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The three contingent elections in American history provide context for 
understanding Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment, and for the sorts of 
troublesome situations that might arise. 
1. The Election of 1800 and the Twelfth Amendment 
Under the original terms of the Constitution, 14 each member of the 
Electoral College would cast two votes for president. The candidate with the 
most electoral votes would become president, unless that person lacked a 
majority of the whole number of electors appointed. In such a case, the 
House of Representatives would choose from among the top five candi-
dates, 15 with each state delegation getting one vote. If two or three candi-
dates had a majority but were tied for the lead, the House would choose 
between just them. Once a president was chosen-either by regular or con-
tingent election-whichever remaining candidate had the most electoral 
votes would become vice president, regardless of whether he had a majority. 
In the case of a tie atop the list of remaining candidates, the Senate would 
choose a vice president from among those tied, with each senator getting one 
vote. 
In the run-up to the Election of 1800, John Adams's Federalists and 
Thomas Jefferson's Democratic-Republicans tried to coordinate their respec-
tive electors' second ballots so that all of their electors but one would cast 
their second votes for their candidates' respective running mates. 16 That way 
if their presidential candidate won, his running mate would be right behind 
him and win the vice presidency. 
Jefferson won a majority in the Electoral College, defeating Adams 
seventy-three to sixty-five.17 But Jefferson's running mate Aaron Burr won 
seventy-three votes too; none of Jefferson's electors had voted for someone 
else. Even though everyone knew that Burr had been slated for the vice 
presidency, the House of Representatives had to hold a contingent election. 18 
The Federalists recognized the opportunity for mischief: by voting for 
Burr they might be able to deprive their enemy Jefferson of the presidency. 19 
14 All of the constitutional provisions referenced in this paragraph are in the original ver-
sion of U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
15 Left uncertain was what would be done if there were a tie for fifth place-include all 
six people as being in the "five highest on the list" or only include the top four so that there 
would not be more than five. 
16 NEALE, supra note 8, at 2 & n.4. 
17 See 1800 Election Results, DAVE LE1P's ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http:// 
uselectionatlas.org/U S PRES! DENT/GENERAL/pc 1800.htm I [https://perma.cc/5DYG-
Y ACS]. 
18 See NEALE, supra note 8, at 2. 
19 See id. at 3-4. Aiding them in their intrigue was the fact that under the original Consti-
tution it was the outgoing House, not the newly elected one that held the contingent election. 
This was because congressional terms and presidential terms expired on the same day. If the 
president was to be chosen before the start of the new term, the contingent election therefore 
had to be done by the old House. The Twentieth Amendment changed this, though Congress 
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The Federalists controlled eight state delegations, versus seven for the Dem-
ocratic-Republicans (Vermont was evenly split).20 
With sixteen states represented, Jefferson needed nine to win. On the 
first ballot, Jefferson won only eight: all seven Democratic-Republican states 
and one of the Federalist states. Six Federalist states voted for Burr and one 
split (as did Vermont). 21 The House had to re-vote until someone won nine 
states. On February 17, after seven days and thirty-six ballots, the two split 
states shifted to Jefferson, giving him ten states and the presidency.22 
Although Jefferson won in the end, the episode showed the perils of 
leaving constitutional processes to partisan political actors. Today, as in 
1801, it is not unknown for politicians to privilege their political preferences 
and interests over vague notions of fair play. Currently, if a candidate in a 
contingent election died, there is no reason to doubt that modem-day coun-
terparts of Burr's Federalist voters would seize the opportunity to vanquish 
their political opponents. 
The Jefferson-Burr episode also shows how Congress deals with consti-
tutional designs that fail in dangerous ways: by waiting until after they have 
failed, and then crafting narrowly tailored solutions. Out of the shambles of 
the Election of 1800 came the Twelfth Amendment, which was ratified just 
in time for the 1804 election.23 The principal change the amendment made 
was to have electors cast separate ballots for president and vice president. 24 
If the Twelfth Amendment had been in place in 1800, Jefferson would have 
won a majority of the presidential electoral votes, Burr would have won a 
majority of the vice-presidential electoral votes, and the mischievous House 
would not have been involved.25 
technically could legislate a timetable that once again lets the old House choose the president. 
See infra notes 64--65 and accompanying text. 
20 These figures can be pieced together painstakingly from the BIOGRAPHICAL DtRECTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Nov. 3, 2016); but 
they are also consistent with the information more easily accessible at 6th United States Con-
gress, WIKWEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6th_United_States_Congress [https://perma 
.cc/5C6Y-JJJF]. 
The fact that the new House favored the Democratic-Republicans by ten states to three (with 
three more states evenly split) did Jefferson no good. See supra note 19. These figures can be 
pieced together painstakingly from the BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Nov. 3, 2016); but they are also consis-
tent with the information more easily accessible at 7th United States Congress, WtKlPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7th_United_States_Congress [https://perma.cc/9Q4H-9L38]. 
21 See IO ANNALS OF CONG. 1028-33 (1801); supra note 20 (giving sources for party/state 
breakdowns). 
22 See 10 ANNALS OP CoNG. 1028-33 (1801 ); NEALE, supra note 8, at 3. 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XII; NEALE, supra note 8, at 3. 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
25 The Twelfth Amendment's change also addressed a problem from the Election of 1796. 
Because the parties were not then as disciplined in coordinating their electors' second ballots, 
John Adams was elected president while Jefferson, his fierce rival, became his vice president. 
See NEALE, supra note 8, at 2. That state of affairs had been problematic, to say the least. With 
the Twelfth Amendment, the possibility of a split ticket being elected is confined mainly to 
contingent elections. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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The main significance of the Election of 1800 for this Article, though, 
is that it rewrote the rules for contingent presidential and vice-presidential 
elections. With the exception of a couple of important changes subsequently 
made by the Twentieth Amendment, these rules remain in force today. 
The Twelfth Amendment kept much of the original Constitution's struc-
ture for contingent presidential elections: voting was still by the old House; 
each state's House delegation still got one vote; and a majority of states was 
required for victory.26 But the Twelfth Amendment provided that the House 
would choose "from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding 
three on the list of those voted for as President."27 By reducing the number 
of candidates from five to three, the Twelfth Amendment reduced (but did 
not eliminate) the risk of a deadlock in the House.28 
The amendment also provided a backstop in case there was a deadlock: 
if the beginning of the term rolled around without the House having made a 
choice, the vice president would act as president.29 Of course, that assumed 
that a vice president had been chosen. But the Twelfth Amendment added a 
new requirement to be elected vice president: an electoral-college majority.30 
With a two-party system and with separate balloting for president and vice 
president, chances were good that if nobody won an electoral-college major-
ity for president, nobody would win one for vice president either. 31 There-
fore, the Twelfth Amendment's provisions for contingent vice-presidential 
elections were more important than those in the original Constitution. 
The Twelfth Amendment provided that if no vice-presidential candidate 
had won a majority, the Senate would choose a vice president from "the two 
26 U.S. CoNST. amend. XII. 
27 Id. (emphasis added). There might not be three candidates to choose from; if only two 
candidates receive electoral votes and they are tied (or otherwise short of a majority), there 
would only be two candidates. The amendment's language leaves it unclear what happens in 
the case of other sorts of ties. Specifically, it is unclear whether "the persons having the 
highest numbers not exceeding three" means the three highest people or the three highest 
numbers. If it is the latter, then there could be more than three candidates if there are any ties 
for first, second, or third. If it is the former, it is arguable that if two candidates are tied for 
third then they cannot participate because that would cause the number of persons to exceed 
three (and heaven forbid there is a four-way tie for first). See Josephson, supra note 4, at 668 
(recommending allowing more than three candidates in case of ties); cf id. at 633-35 (discuss-
ing "not exceeding three" issues, mainly other than these). 
28 See infra note 33 and accompanying text (describing potential deadlocks in the House). 
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The language of the amendment left it unclear whether the 
vice president would serve for the entire term or just until the House finally chose a president. 
See id. ("And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a president whenever the right 
of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as president, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disabil-
ity of the president."). The Twentieth Amendment resolved this by specifying that the House 
could select a president even after the beginning of the term, and that that president would then 
take over. See id. amend. XX, § 3. 
30 See id. amend. XII. 
31 Curiously, though, the two contingent elections conducted since the adoption of the 
Twelfth Amendment have been one or the other; neither was for both president and vice presi-
dent. See infra Sections Il.A.2-3. 
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highest numbers on the list."32 The House has ample opportunities to dead-
lock-with three candidates, and with the possibility of split state delega-
tions voiding some state's votes, it might be hard to win a majority of 
states. 33 The Senate has fewer. With just two candidates,34 and with every 
senator's vote counting, the Senate could only deadlock if the Senate itself 
was divided perfectly evenly or if too many senators were absent. 35 This 
relative certainty of obtaining a result makes the Senate procedure a sounder 
backstop. 
32 U.S. CoNST. amend. XII. In contrast to the vague language for contingent presidential 
elections, this language makes it clearer that all of those tied for first or second should be 
included, even though that would mean there are more than two candidates. See Josephson, 
supra note 4, at 613-14 (discussing Senate's ability to consider more than two candidates in 
case of ties). Cf supra note 27 (discussing presidential elections). Notably, the Twentieth 
Amendment refers to "any" of the contingent vice-presidential candidates dying rather than 
"either" of them. U.S. CoNST. amend. XX, § 4. 
33 To win, a candidate must get a "majority of all the states," which is harder to achieve 
with three candidates than with two. The further difficulty posed by split delegations-even if 
there are only two candidates there might not be a majority winner in a particular delegation, 
but again this is much more likely if there are three candidates--could be resolved by the 
House declaring in its rules that a candidate only needs a plurality of the delegation's ballots to 
win its vote. This is not how the House did it in 1825, but the House is not bound by previous 
Houses' rules. See l REG. DEB. 362 (1825) (requiring a majority); Neale, supra note 8, at 12 
(discussing possibilities for allowing plurality voting). Pluralities were not an issue in 1801 
because there were only two candidates, so only ties could prevent a state from casting a vote. 
See 10 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1009-10 (1801) (requiring evenly divided states to vote as 
"divided"). 
There is a third source of potential deadlocks. The Twelfth Amendment requires a quorum of 
a member or members from at least two-thirds of the states. This gives small groups a potential 
mechanism to prevent the contingent election from going forward (presumably either to extract 
concessions or to keep an opponent from winning). 
34 This assumes that there are no ties. But see supra note 32 (describing the Twelfth 
Amendment's tie-friendly language for contingent vice presidential elections). 
35 The Twelfth Amendment requires a quorum of "two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators," and victory requires a "majority of the whole number" rather than just a majority 
of those present. A sufficiently large minority of senators (one-third plus one) might thus 
prevent the majority from making its choice. See Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas M. Rollins, 
Deadlock: What Happens If Nobody Wins, ATLANTIC MoNTHL Y, Oct. 1980, at 49, 61 (discuss-
ing possible Senate quorum shenanigans). 
As a separate matter, it is arguable that if the Senate were tied, the sitting vice president 
could cast a tiebreaking vote. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (granting the vice president a 
vote when the Senate is "equally divided"); Roy E. Brownell II, A Constitutional Chameleon: 
The Vice President's Place Within the American System of Separation of Powers Part I: Text, 
Structure, Views of the Framers and the Courts, 24 KAN. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y (Fall 2014), at I, 
45-46 (giving broad view of vice president's power to break ties in contingent vice-presiden-
tial elections). However, it is doubtful that this general power extends to contingent elections, 
because the Twelfth Amendment's requirement of a majority of the whole number of sena-
tors-and the fact that the vice president is not a senator-could be read as requiring fifty-one 
votes rather than fifty plus the vice president's. See Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act 
Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1653, 1710 n.246 (2002) (discussing the two sides of this 
debate). 
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2. The Election of 1824 
The Twelfth Amendment's procedure for contingent presidential elec-
tions has been used only once, after the Election of 1824. That election was 
also the one that came closest to a Section 4 situation (a dead candidate in a 
contingent election). 
The Election of 1824 came after the end of the first two-party system 
(Federalists versus Democratic-Republicans) and before the rise of the next 
one (Democrats versus Whigs).36 In 1820, the lack of a credible Federalist 
opponent effectively meant that President Monroe was able to run for reelec-
tion unopposed. 37 In 1824, however, the Democratic-Republicans could not 
unite behind a single candidate. Four contenders-John Quincy Adams, 
Henry Clay, William Crawford, and Andrew Jackson-mounted serious 
campaigns. 38 
With all four candidates drawing significant support, nobody won a ma-
jority of the Electoral College. Jackson led with ninety-nine votes, followed 
by Adams with eighty-four, Crawford with forty-one, and Clay with thirty-
seven.39 (Interestingly, Jackson and Adams both had John C. Calhoun as 
their running mate, so Calhoun won the vice presidency outright.40) 
The House's contingent election was held in February 1825. Under the 
Twelfth Amendment, only the top three candidates competed; Clay was out. 
But once again, it was the old House-which Clay led as Speaker-that 
selected the president. Clay threw his support to Adams, who won on the 
first ballot with thirteen states, against seven for Jackson and four for 
Crawford.41 
Crawford's health was an issue for him; he suffered a paralytic illness 
before the election, and while his supporters claimed that he had recovered 
sufficiently there is little doubt that his condition hindered his electoral pros-
pects.42 But Crawford's health was good enough that he was under no pres-
sure to drop out of the contingent election, and the situation did not seem to 
affect (let alone inspire) the creation of Section 4 a century later.43 Still, the 
Election of 1824 illustrates the possibility both of contingent elections and of 
36 See Neale, supra note 8, at 5. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See 1 REG. DEB. 526 (1825); 1824 Election Results, DAVE LE1P's ATLAS or U.S. 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/USPRES ID ENT /GENERAL/pe 1824 .html 
[https://perma.cc/SQ7D-64KQ]. 
40 See 1 REG. DEB. 526 (1825); 1824 Election Results, supra note 39. 
41 See 1 REG. DEB. 526-27 (1825); 1824 Election Results, supra note 39; Neale, supra 
note 8, at 5 (describing Clay's actions). 
42 See CHASE C. MOONEY, W11,L1AM H. CRAWFORD, 1772-1834, 241-42 (1974). 
43 In the thorough legislative history of the Twentieth Amendment compiled by ProQuest 
Legislative Insight, Crawford is mentioned in Congress only twice. Both times are only in 
passing, and neither mentions his illness. See 75 CoNG. REc. 3823 (1932); 69 id. at 4214 
(1928). 
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physically unwell candidates. If Crawford had relapsed and died in the midst 
of the contingent election, who knows what might have happened? 
3. The Election of 1836 
The only contingent vice presidential election occurred in February 
1837. In the presidential race, Martin Van Buren won an electoral-college 
majority with 170 votes against his four Whig opponents' combined 124 
votes.44 But Van Buren's running mate, Richard M. Johnson, was controver-
sial; all twenty-three of Virginia's electors disregarded their instructions and 
voted for someone else.45 With 147 votes-exactly half of the total-John-
son was short of a majority and the Senate had to hold a contingent election 
between Johnson and the leading Whig candidate, Francis Granger. It did, 
and Johnson won it easily.46 But if Johnson had died during the pendency of 
the contingent election, Granger would have become vice president by 
default. 
B. Candidate Deaths 
In two elections, a candidate died during the election process. In both 
cases, the dead candidate lost and the death did not seem to affect the out-
come. They showed, however, that candidates sometimes do, in fact, die. 
These two episodes also give us a glimpse-one discouraging and one en-
couraging-of how a candidate death might be handled. 
In 1872, Democratic presidential candidate Horace Greeley died be-
tween Election Day (when he was soundly defeated by Republican incu~­
bent Ulysses Grant, 286 electoral votes to 66) and the day on which the 
Electoral College officially convened to cast its votes.47 It was unclear to the 
electors how to proceed. Only three voted for the deceased Greeley, and 
Congress later declined to count those votes, albeit on a questionable basis.48 
44 See 1836 Election Results, DAVE LEIP's ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http:// 
uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/GENERAL/pe1836.html [https://perma.cc/4E4Q-
NXSM]. 
45 See NEALE, supra note 8, at 6 & n.15 (explaining Virginians' objections to Johnson's 
common-law marriage to a black woman). 
46 See 1836 Election Results, supra note 44. Johnson won the Senate vote 33 to 16. CONG. 
GLOBE, 24TH CONG., 2D SESS. 166 (1837). 
47 See 1872 Election Results, DAVE LE11>'s All,AS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http:// 
uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT /GENERAL/pe 1872.html [https ://perma.cc/2TR V -4A4 P]. 
48 See id. (recording all electoral votes). The House voted narrowly against counting the 
dead Greeley's votes by a margin of 101 to 99, with 40 members not voting. CONG. GLOBE, 
42D CoNG., 3D Snss. 1297 (1873). The Senate voted overwhelmingly in favor of counting the 
votes, 44 to 19. Id at 1287; see also 3 Asher c. Hinds, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 270 (1907) (summarizing Greeley episode). Signifi-
cantly, though, Congress followed its Joint Rule 22, which stated that if an objection was made 
to counting particular electoral votes, both chambers had to agree that those votes were valid 
before they could be included. See CONG. GLOBE, 420 CONG., 3D SEss. 1296 (1873). Besides 
being a bad idea with a discredited genesis, Joint Rule 22's one-house veto was probably 
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Another eighteen voted for B. Gratz Brown, Greeley's running mate, and 
three more voted for two other candidates, but the bulk of the votes-the 
remaining forty-two-went to Thomas Hendricks, the newly elected gover-
nor of Indiana.49 The question of "replacement" has obvious importance for 
our Section 4 discussion, but the Greeley precedent is relevant to our discus-
sion for a more direct, disturbing reason. Greeley had lost the election so 
decisively that there was much less incentive for his electors to figure out an 
optimal resolution of the situation. Unfortunately, a suboptimal resolution is 
exactly what they delivered, and while the Greeley precedent has never been 
applied it has also never been disavowed. By suggesting that presidential 
candidates must be alive to receive electoral votes, the Greeley precedent 
suggests by analogy that a dead candidate cannot receive votes in a contin-
gent election either.so 
The Election of 1912 offers a more encouraging result. In 1912, Presi-
dent William Taft and his vice president, James Sherman, were running for 
reelection. Sherman died six days before the election, and there was no time 
to replace him on the ballot.s 1 But Taft lost badly, winning only 8 electoral 
votes against 88 for Theodore Roosevelt's third-party effort and 435 for the 
victor, Woodrow Wilson.s2 Though the issue of whether and how to replace 
Sherman was now much less salient, the Republican National Committee 
met after the election and decided to direct the eight Taft electors to cast 
their vice-presidential ballots for Nicholas Butler, which the electors did.53 
While Sherman died before the election, his ticket's dismal results were 
known before any discussion of replacement got off the ground, so perhaps 
Sherman's replacement was not as carefully considered as a candidate death 
in a contingent election might need to be. Nevertheless, the Republican Party 
unconstitutional, and in any case it was repudiated not long afterward. See Kesavan, supra 
note 35, at 1676-77 (criticizing rule and detailing its demise). One would hope that if the 
Greeley precedent ever comes up for reconsideration, these weaknesses will be taken 
seriously. 
49 See 1872 Election Results, supra note 47. It is unclear what process resulted in Hen-
dricks receiving so many votes instead of Brown. 
50 See infra Section III.C. l. 
51 See FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL or LAw's CLINIC ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, 
Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modem Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 
53 (2012) [hereinafter Fordham Clinic]. 
52 See 1912 Presidential General Election Results, DAVE Lmr's ATLAS or U.S. PRESIDEN-
TIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year= 1912 [https://perma 
.ccNSZC-7K2E]. Roosevelt had been shot in the chest by a would-be assassin in October, but 
his injuries were not grave enough to generate any Section 4 overtones. See generally GERARD 
HELFERICH, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE ASSASSIN: MADNESS, VENGEANCE, AND THE CAM-
PAIGN OF J9J2 (2013). 
53 See Fordham Clinic, supra note 51, at 53. Butler was the President of Columbia Univer-
sity. See id. Some sources report that the Republican National Committee did not meet, in 
which case the electors somehow chose Butler amongst themselves. See, e.g., CHICAGO DAILY 
NEWS Co., THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS ALMANAC AND YEARBOOK FOR 1915, at 342 (1914) 
(stating that the meeting was "called off' and that "no formal action was ever taken on the 
subject"). 
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showed that it was feasible to coordinate a replacement candidate in an or-
derly manner. 
C. The Origins of Section 4 
Constitutional changes like Section 4 usually emerge when events make 
their necessity clear. The Twelfth Amendment's inspiration by the Election 
of 1800, discussed above, is a perfect example. The Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment's provisions on presidential succession, vice-presidential vacancies, 
and presidential disability are another; they emerged from long-running con-
sideration of those issues, but the effort was catalyzed by the assassination of 
President Kennedy. 54 
By contrast, Section 4 emerged almost out of the blue. The precedents 
discussed above-a few contingent elections and a couple of losing-candi-
date deaths-did not produce any sort of groundswell for reform. Section 4 
emerged instead from a rare burst of proactive problem solving, which pig-
gybacked on a separate reform effort to which Section 4 was related only 
tangentially. 
The core of the Twentieth Amendment is its reform of the awkward 
calendar with which Congress and the presidency had been saddled, with a 
long lame-duck period after elections, and an even longer wait for newly 
elected legislators to begin their service. The Constitution originally speci-
fied only the length of congressional and presidential terms, not their starting 
date. Because it was unclear when the Constitution would be ratified, if at 
all, the Constitution merely provided that it would go into effect when nine 
states ratified it, which occurred in summer 1788.55 At that point, though, 
states still needed to hold elections and the new government needed time to 
assemble. Considering all of this, the outgoing Articles of Confederation 
government declared March 4, 1789, as the beginning of the new govern-
ment-and thus the beginning of the congressional and presidential terms.56 
The Constitution did, however, specify that Congress should assemble 
at least once a year, on the first Monday in December unless a different day 
54 See Neale, supra note 8, at 17. Cf Tribe & Rollins, supra note 35, at 62 (quoting 
Thomas Jefferson for the notion that good policies can emerge more easily from resolving 
crises than from "years of prudent and conciliatory administration"). 
55 U.S. CONST. art. VII; David E. Kyvig, Redesigning Congress: The Seventeenth and 
Twentieth Amendments to the Constitution, in THE AMERICAN CoNGREss: THE BuILDLNG OP 
DEMOCRACY 356, 363 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2004). 
56 See 34 JouRNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 521-23 (Roscoe R. 
Hill ed., 1937) (resolving on September 13, 1788 that "the first Wednesday in March next" be 
the time for "commencing proceedings under the said constitution"); Josephson, supra note 4, 
at 609-10. It actually took until April 6 before enough representatives and senators appeared in 
the capital for there to be a quorum and for George Washington to be declared the winner of 
the presidential election. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 16-18, 100 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
Washington was not inaugurated until April 30. See id. at 26-27. Congress later confirmed, 
however, that March 4 was the starting date for presidential terms. See Act of March I, 1792, 
ch. 8, § 12, I Stat. 239, 241; Josephson, supra note 4, at 610. 
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was legislated.57 Before the Twentieth Amendment, therefore, Congress was 
elected and convened on a peculiar schedule. Elections were held in Novem-
ber of even-numbered years.58 The next month, the lame-duck Congress 
would convene for a session lasting up to four months until the end of the 
term on March 4. Thus, the new Congress did not convene until December 
of the odd-numbered year, thirteen months after it had been elected.59 
These two features-the long lame-duck session and the long wait for 
the newly elected Congress to begin its service-prompted some grumbling 
over the decades, particularly after elections in which many incumbents 
were defeated or in which partisan control of one or both houses had 
changed.60 In November 1922, after a tumultuous election, Senator Thaddeus 
Caraway introduced a resolution calling for members of Congress who had 
been defeated for re-election not to take part in consequential matters during 
lame-duck sessions. 61 Fatefully, Caraway asked that the resolution be re-
ferred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry because he did not ex-
pect that the Judiciary Committee (the more obvious place to refer it) would 
have taken any action on it.62 
Senator George Norris, the earnest chairman of the Agriculture Com-
mittee, took the resolution seriously. He transformed it into a proposed con-
stitutional amendment that started congressional terms in January instead of 
March, and that changed the default date for convening Congress from De-
cember (thirteen months after the election) to the January start of the term 
(two months after the election).63 
57 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. 
58 It was actually not until the 1870s that Congress required congressional elections to 
occur on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 3, 
17 Stat. 28, 28. Before that, some states did not elect their representatives quite so long before 
the first December session, though this could cause problems when they did not hold the 
elections until after the term began in March, if the president called an immediate special 
session. See Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Dates of Biennial Federal Elections for Congress: 
From 1872 On, THE GREEN PAPERS, http://www.thegreenpapers.com/Hx/BiennialFederalElec-
tionDates.phtml [https://perma.cc/4A38-AEDG] (describing evolution toward a uniform con-
gressional election day). 
59 See Kyvig, supra note 55, at 363. In years in which a new president's term would begin, 
the old president would call the new Senate into special session in March, at the very begin-
ning of the new term, so that it could vote on the new president's key nominees. See Brian C. 
Kalt, Keeping Tillman Adjournment.1· in Their Place: A Rejoinder to Seth Barrett Tillman, 101 
Nw. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 108, 111-12 (2007). 
60 See Kyvig, supra note 55, at 363-64; see also GEORGE w. NORRIS, FIGHTING LIBERAL: 
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE w. NORRIS 332 (1945) (noting incentive of soon-to-be-un-
employed lame ducks to slavishly follow a president's agenda in order to obtain an executive 
appointment). 
61 See 63 CONG. REC. 25-27 (1922) (introducing and discussing S. Con. Res. 29); NORRIS, 
supra note 60, at 328-29 (describing Caraway's inspiration). 
62 63 CONG. REC. 26 (1922) (remarks of Sen. Caraway). 
63 S.J. Res. 253, 67th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Agric. & Forestry, Dec. 5, 
1922); see RICHARD LowITr, GEORGE w. NORRIS: THE PERSISTENCE or A PROGRESSIVE, 
1913-1933, at 155-56 (1971) (describing Norris's proposal). Norris's proposal was probably 
influenced by the constitutional amendment Senator Henry Ashurst proposed in 1921 that, 
identically to Norris's proposal, moved the start of congressional terms and sessions to the first 
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Significantly, the proposal also decoupled presidential terms from con-
gressional terms, starting presidential terms two weeks later. 64 This change 
was intended to improve the legitimacy of contingent elections. In contrast 
to the system under both the original Constitution and the Twelfth Amend-
ment, in which the outgoing House or Senate conducted any contingent elec-
tions, Norris's proposal respected the fresh mandate from the voters by 
structuring things so that the new House or Senate would likely make the 
choice.65 
This level of proactivity was commendable. There had not been a con-
tingent election in the memory of anyone then serving in Congress, but Sen-
ator Norris and his like-minded colleagues wanted to be sure that if there 
ever was one, it would be more legitimate. 
Norris's proposal passed the Senate by an overwhelming margin.66 In 
the House, however, the resolution went nowhere, despite a favorable com-
Monday in January, and the start of presidential terms to the third Monday in January. S.J. Res. 
8, 67th Cong. (1921); 64 CONG. REC. 3495 (1923) (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (recalling his 
resolution and consideration of it). Ashurst, for his part, was drawing on earlier efforts. See 74 
CONG. REC. 5877 (1931) (statement of Rep. Gifford) (describing numerous such attempts). 
Norris's proposal also included material on electoral-college reform, but this was excised 
before his proposal passed the Senate. See S.J. Res. 253 (as passed by Senate, Feb. 13, 1923). 
64 See S.J. Res. 253 (as reported by S. Comm. on Agric. & Forestry, Dec. 5, 1922); Kyvig, 
supra note 55, at 365 (describing Norris's proposal); see also supra note 63 (describing similar 
earlier proposal by Senator Ashurst). 
65 There are many statements in the legislative history declaring that the amendment 
would shift contingent elections from the old Congress to the new one, and that this would be a 
good thing. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 72-26, at 4 (1932) ("If the amendment we have proposed is 
adopted and becomes part of the Constitution ... the new House of Representatives fresh from 
the people would be the one upon which would devolve the power to select the new Presi-
dent."); 74 CONG. REC. 5892 (1931) (statement of Rep. Johnson); 69 CONG. REc. 953 (1928) 
(statement of Sen. Norris); 64 CONG. REc. 3498 (1923) (statement of Sen. Ashurst) ("At the 
present time it is the old Congress that elects the President under such contingency, and 
thereby it becomes possible for a political party repudiated by the people to elect a President 
who was defeated at the election."). 
However, there is nothing in the text of the Twentieth Amendment that would actually pre-
clude legislation from moving the date for counting electoral votes back before the end of the 
term on January 3 and restoring power over contingent elections to the old Congress. See 
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDEN-
TIAL SucCESSION 47 (1992). One can imagine a lame-duck Congress and president passing 
such legislation for good reasons (to settle the unresolved presidential election sooner and get 
the winner's transition moving) or bad ones (to prevent the new Congress from coming in and 
choosing a different winner than the one preferred by the old Congress and president). See 
Josephson, supra note 4, at 646 (exploring this possibility); Allan J. Mayer & Howard 
Fineman, Electoral Roulette, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1980, at 35 (quoting Senate staffer as say-
ing there is no legal reason why the old Congress could not pass such legislation, but adding 
that "if they tried it, we'd have shooting in the streets"). But such a move would contravene 
the intent and understanding of the Twentieth Amendment's framers cited above, especially if 
done in the middle of a hotly contested election. See Tribe & Rollins, supra note 35, at 58. See 
generally VINCENT A. DOYLE & ROBERT L. TIENKEN, LIBRARY OP CONG. LEGISLATIVE REPER-
ENCE SERV., 434/107, CONTINGENT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE HousE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES - NEWLY ELECTED OR "LAME DucK" HOUSE? (1968) (presenting both sides of the 
debate on lame-duck Congresses' ability to legislate themselves the power to hold a contingent 
election). 
66 See 64 CONG. REC. 3540--41 (1924) (recording 63-6 Senate vote). 
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mittee report. 67 The House leadership wanted nothing to do with it, notwith-
standing support for the resolution among the rank and file. 68 
Norris tried again in 1924, in the next Congress, and again easily got 
his resolution through the Senate.69 This time in the House, excellent work 
was done in committee-work that produced what became Section 4. Be-
cause the amendment opened up the topic of presidential transitions, the res-
olution presented an opportunity for the House Committee on Election of the 
President, Vice President, and Representatives in Congress to address an 
area of weakness in the constitutional structure: candidate deaths between 
Election Day and Inauguration Day. The House committee identified numer-
ous points of vulnerability and added language to the resolution that ad-
dressed some of them.70 Among them: What if the president-elect died?71 
67 See H.R. REP. No. 68-513 (1924); NORRIS, supra note 60, at 337 (recounting favorable 
House committee report). 
68 See 69 Co NG. REc. 4358 ( 1928) (statement of Rep. K vale) (stating that a majority in the 
House had supported the resolution); Lowrn, supra note 63, at 157 (describing opposition 
among House leadership); NORRIS, supra note 60, at 337-39. The House leadership's opposi-
tion was apparently in deference to the president, who opposed giving up the power with 
which the lame-duck session provided him. See Lowrn, supra note 63, at 156-57, 275-76. 
69 See 65 CONG. REc. 4418 (1924) (recording 63-7 Senate vote); Nrnrn1s, supra note 60, 
at 337. 
70 See Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Fixing the Com-
mencement of the Terms of President and Vice President and Members of Congress, and Fix-
ing the Time of the Assembling of Congress: Hearings on H.J. Res. 56, H.J. Res. 164, S.J. Res. 
9 Before the H. Comm. on Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives in Con-
gress, 69th Cong. 25-26 (1926) [hereinafter Hearings on H.J. Res. 56] (statement of Rep. 
Ralph Lozier) (describing efforts of himself and Representatives White, Gifford, and Free in 
committee); H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 5-8 (l 926) (discussing additions); 74 CoNG. REc. 5877 
(1931) (statement of Rep. Gifford) ("We found that the so-called lame-duck feature of the 
resolution was by no means the only thing deserving of consideration .... "); 75 CONG. REc. 
3825-26 (1932) (statement of Rep. Gifford) (attributing impetus for these additional consider-
ations to longtime House employee Tyler Page); see also Proposed Constitutional Amend-
ments Relating to the Fixing of the Time for the Commencement of the Terms of President, Vice 
President, and Members of Congress, and Fixing the Time of the Assembling of Congress; and 
to the Presidential Succession; and to the Electoral College System: Hearings on H.J. Res. 65, 
H.J. Res. 9, H.J. Res. 216, H.J. Res. 292 Before the H. Comm. on Election of President, Vice 
President, and Representatives in Congress, 71 st Cong. l-3 (1930) [hereinafter Hearings on 
H.J. Res. 65] (statement of William Tyler Page, Clerk of the House of Reps.) (listing wide 
variety of contingencies that Page led the House to consider); 69 CoNG. REc. 4208--09 (1928) 
(statement of Rep. Lozier) (running through implications of a candidate death at various points 
on the electoral timeline). 
The House committee did not add any language to deal with candidate deaths before Elec-
tion Day or between Election Day and the day on which the Electoral College votes because of 
political parties' existing ability to handle these situations. See H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 6. 
71 See H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 2, 5-7. The committee was fairly sure that even without 
its amendment (which became part of Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment), the vice presi-
dent-elect would take the oath as president in such an instance, but they thought that the path 
would be smoothed by adding express constitutional language to that effect. See U.S. CoNST. 
amend. XX, § 3; H.R. REP. No. 69-31 l, at 7. One can imagine that otherwise, the losing 
presidential candidate might call for a new election or, if the electoral votes had not yet been 
counted, for the dead president-elect's electoral votes not to be counted, throwing the election 
into the House. 
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What if the vice president-elect died too?72 What if a contingent election was 
not resolved by the time the new term started?73 And-most importantly for 
this Article's purposes-what if a candidate in a contingent election died?74 
The committee was concerned that in such a situation the dead candidate's 
supporters would effectively be disenfranchised.75 
Unfortunately for posterity, the historical record offers no details on 
how the committee members worked through these hypothetical problems, 
or how they decided that it was politically worthwhile to push for solutions 
when there were no powerful constituencies agitating for such an effort. 
Most significantly for this Article, the historical record also offers no details 
on the fateful decision the committee made to "punt" with regard to what 
became Section 4; rather than specify in the amendment what to do if a 
candidate in a contingent election died, the committee opted instead to em-
power Congress to pass legislation to provide for such a situation.76 
The House leadership still refused to let the lame-duck reforms ad-
vance, and so the committee's improved resolution died. 77 For the next sev-
eral years afterward, the pattern repeated: the Senate would pass Senator 
Norris's simpler resolution; the House committee would report its improved 
version; but the House leadership would scheme to defeat it.78 
72 See H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 2, 8. The committee added what became part of Section 3 
of the Twentieth Amendment, authorizing Congress to provide for such a double death. See 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XX, ~ 3. As with Section 4, Congress has not made any real attempt to 
pass legislation to deal with this situation. There is some cover-the same line of succession 
statute that puts the Speaker of the House next in line, followed by the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate and then the cabinet, would also apply to a double vacancy on inauguration day. 
See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). There are good reasons, however, to have a different line of succes-
sion at such times. I am contemplating writing an article that explores this problem. 
73 See H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 1, 5, 8. The committee added what became part of Section 
3 of the Twentieth Amendment, clarifying that the vice president-elect would act as president 
until the House could choose a president. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3; supra note 29 
(describing uncertainty in the Twelfth Amendment's handling of this issue). 
74 See H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 2, 7. 
75 See id. at 7; 69 CONG. REc. 4206-07 (1928) (statement of Rep. Lozier) (recounting 
committee's democratic motivations in adding Section 4). 
76 Interestingly, while the committee did not offer any suggestions for approaches that 
Section 4 legislation should take (it said, tepidly, that "[u]nder some circumstances ... it 
might be advisable to provide for a substitution of a name"), it seemed certain that the dead 
candidate should not be able to receive votes. H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 7. The committee also 
raised the possibility of reconvening the Electoral College. Id. at 7. That possibility is briefly 
explored below. See infra Section III.C.4. 
77 See 69 CoNG. REc. 952 (1928) (statement of Sen. Norris) (recounting treatment of his 
Senate-passed resolutions in previous terms of the House); id. at 4205-06 (statement of Rep. 
Lozier) (recounting and criticizing intransigence of the House's leadership toward Norris's 
efforts). 
78 See S.J. Res. 9, 69th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Dec. 8, 1925); 67 CONG. REC. 
3968-71 (1926) (discussing and passing the resolution, by a 73-2 vote, in the Senate); S.J. 
Res. 9 (as reported by H. Comm. on Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives 
in Congress, Feb. 24, 1926); 69 CoNG. REc. 952 (1928) (statement of Sen. Norris) (recounting 
House treatment of his Senate-passed resolutions in the last few terms of the House). 
In 1928, the House leadership finally allowed a vote on the resolution, but it was defeated 
after objectionable changes were added to it that would have ended the second session of each 
term on May 4, thus limiting it to about four months. See id. at 4430 (recording 209-157 
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Norris did not oppose the House committee's improvements-indeed, it 
appears that nobody did-but as a matter of legislative efficiency he figured 
that it was best to keep re-passing the same old resolution in the Senate. He 
could worry about the House committee's changes if and when the full 
House passed something and the two versions went to a conference 
committee. 79 
The logjam broke when the Democrats took over the House in Decem-
ber 1931.80 After the House passed the committee's improved version of the 
Senate resolution it went to conference committee where the Senate negotia-
tors readily accepted the House committee's improvements.81 With that, Con-
gress passed it and, after swift ratification by the states, Section 4 and the 
rest of the Twentieth Amendment became the law of the land.82 
Congress did not attempt to use its new authority, though. The proac-
tive impulse that motivated Section 4's creation in 1926 was sufficient to 
carry it through to the Twentieth Amendment's 1932 passage, but it was not 
sufficient to launch a new legislative effort after the amendment's ratifica-
tion. Nor did it (or any other impulse) lead any subsequent Congresses to 
make a serious effort to implement Section 4. Senator Paul Simon intro-
duced two Section 4 bills in the 1990s, but they made no impact in commit-
tee, let alone in the full Senate.83 Those two fruitless efforts nevertheless 
House vote in favor of the resolution, short of the two-thirds needed for a constitutional 
amendment); 75 id. at 3834 (1932) (statement of Rep. Frear) (describing effects of objectiona-
ble changes); Kyvig, supra note 55, at 366 (describing 1928 House defeat). 
In February 1931, the House (in its lame duck session, ironically) passed the same objec-
tionable version in an effort to head off Norris' s stronger version, but it was too close to the 
end of the term for any suitable agreement to emerge from a conference committee. See 74 
CoNG. REc. 5907-08 (1931) (recording 290-93 House vote); 75 CoNG. REc. 1372 (1932) 
(statement of Sen. Norris) (describing timing of the resolution's death); see also NORRIS, supra 
note 60, at 340; Kyvig, supra note 55, at 366. 
79 See Hearings on H.J. Res. 65, supra note 70, at 13-14 (comments of Rep. Lozier) 
(recounting Senator Norris's explanation); 69 CONG. REc. 4365 (1928) (statement of Rep. 
Ramseyer) (stating that Section 4 was unopposed); id. at 4206 (statement of Rep. Lozier) 
(noting Norris's support for Section 4 despite his failure to include it in his resolutions); id. at 
953 (statement of Sen. Norris) (explaining his reasons for not including the House's additions 
in his resolutions). 
80 See Lowirr, supra note 63, at 517 (describing effects of change in House leadership); 
NORRIS, supra note 60, at 341-42. 
81 See H.R. REP. No. 72-633, at 3-4 (1932) (Conf. Rep.). 
82 See 75 CoNG. REC. 5086 (1932) (recording 74-3 Senate vote); 75 CONG. REc. 5027 
(1932) (recording House approval); Kyvig, supra note 55, at 367--68 (describing rapid ratifica-
tion process). 
83 See Presidential Succession Clarification Act, S. 1997, 104th Cong.§ 5 (1996) (legisla-
tive history showing the bill dying in committee is available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
I 04th-congress/senate-bill/1997 /all-actions [https://perma.cc/7G7V-CWWF]); Presidential 
Succession Clarification Act, S. 2562, 103rd Cong. § 5 (1994) (legislative history showing the 
bill dying in committee is available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/senate-
bill/2562/all-actions [https://perrna.cc/26YU-KLR2]). Another effort worth noting here is a 
1992 resolution by then-Representative Pat Roberts calling for the establishment of a panel of 
constitutional experts to make recommendations to the House for its contingent-election 
processes. See H. Res. 478, 102d Cong. (1992) (legislative history showing the resolution 
dying in committee is available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-reso-
lution/478/all-actions [https://perrna.cc/NW6P-JLHP]); Josephson, supra note 4, at 647-48 
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represent a high-water mark; lonely exceptions to more than eighty years of 
congressional indifference toward its Section 4 mandate. 
III. AN IDEAL SECTION 4 LA w 
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress has never used its Section 4 
power and (for reasons discussed in Part IV) is unlikely to do so any time 
soon, it is a good idea to think now about how best to design a Section 4 
law. There are two main reasons why it is better to pass a law before it is 
needed than to wait until an actual candidate death in an actual contingent 
election. 
The first reason is that while the combination of a contingent election 
and a candidate death is unlikely, it would be a high-stakes, highly 
politicized situation if it ever did happen. In such a moment, it would be 
very difficult for people to put aside the best interests of their factions and 
think instead about what would be best for the country. 84 The more analysis 
that takes place before such an event-behind a veil of ignorance that makes 
it easier to think in terms of principle rather than political expedience-the 
better the chances are that a good design will win out. 85 
The second reason, and the basis for the scenario that opened this Arti-
cle, is that the lack of a candidate-replacement law adds an incentive for the 
sort of assassination that opened this Article. 86 There is no way to eliminate 
entirely the incentive to assassinate presidential candidates and presidents, 
but at other stages in the process the Constitution lowers the payoff substan-
tially. The Twelfth Amendment's reform of electing a president and vice 
president together as a team ensures that killing a president means replacing 
him with someone aligned with him. 87 This feature is bolstered by the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment's reform of allowing presidents to nominate a new 
vice president when there is a vice-presidential vacancy.88 Section 3 of the 
(discussing Roberts's futile attempt, and a similarly fruitless one by Representative John Bur-
ton in 1980). 
84 See 140 CONG. REC. 29,547 (1994) (statement of Sen. Simon) (stating, while introduc-
ing legislation covering Section 4 and similar situations, "None of these scenarios, of course, 
is likely to occur during any election cycle. But any one of them could lead to confusion and 
uncertainty at a time when clarity and stability would be vital. Prudence dictates that we 
should act now, while we have the time for calm reflection, rather than wait for a possible 
crisis to catch us unprepared."). 
85 Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitu-
tion's Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 227 (1995) (arguing for legislation behind a "veil 
of ignorance" in a related candidate-death situation). 
86 Cf Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MtNN. L. REv. 347, 421 n.567 
(2010) (inviting suspicion of "legal rules that have the effect of incentivizing assassination"). 
87 See supra text accompanying note 24 (discussing this reform). 
88 See U.S. CoNST. amend. XXV, § 2. Ideally, the line of succession after the vice presi-
dent would keep power within the president's circle. The current succession law, passed in 
1947, fails this test because it features congressional leaders who may be (and usually have 
been) from the other party. See BRIAN c. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS 99-100 
(2012). The previous succession law included just the Cabinet, and so reduced the ability of an 
assassin to wreak regime change. See id. at 104. 
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Twentieth Amendment extends this to the post-election, pre-inaugural period 
by specifying that the vice president-elect swears in as president if the presi-
dent-elect dies. 89 Before the election, the same principles apply, less for-
mally but more flexibly. Candidates who die before Election Day can be 
replaced by their parties.90 Even after Election Day, parties can coordinate a 
replacement for whom members of the Electoral College can vote in 
December.91 
But in the absence of a candidate-replacement law, contingent elections 
present a unique difficulty. Because the Twelfth Amendment specifies and 
limits the candidate list in contingent elections, killing someone on the list 
arguably eliminates that person and his or her party from the running. With-
out a pre-existing Section 4 law-and without a sense that it would be easy 
to pass one on the fly if the need arose-there would thus be a greater incen-
tive to assassinate a candidate here than at any other point in the presiden-
tial-selection process. Presidential assassination is enough of a worry when 
the perpetrators are deranged; it should give us great pause when our sys-
tem's design encourages more calculating killers. 
For these reasons, it is more prudent to design a law now. This part of 
the Article is devoted to that task. It first considers a tangent on timing. 
Next, it examines what would happen without a Section 4 law. It then per-
forms a basic analysis of the principal options for replacing candidates in 
contingent elections. Then, after considering some complications and contin-
gencies, it concludes with proposed legislation. 
A. A Preliminary Tangent on Timing 
Admittedly, the chances of a Section 4 scenario occurring are remote, 
given how rare contingent elections and candidate deaths are. Congress 
could greatly reduce even that risk, though, and it need not use its Section 4 
power to do so. 
By current statute, the Electoral College's members convene to cast 
their votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December, 
which can fall anywhere from December 13 to December 19.92 Congress 
does not count the electoral votes until January 6, soon after the new con-
89 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. 
90 See Fordham Clinic, supra note 51, at 16. 
91 See id.; supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also H.R. 6557, 111 th Cong. § 3 
(2010) (attempting to express the sense of Congress that presidential and vice-presidential 
candidates should indicate at their parties' conventions for whom electors should vote if the 
candidates die before the electors meet to cast their electoral votes). 
92 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). The current date was set in 1934, shortly after the passage of the 
Twentieth Amendment. It had previously been set at the first Wednesday in January. See Wil-
liam Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 176 
(1996). 
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gressional term begins.93 If Congress were to make the Electoral College's 
meeting date much later-perhaps the day before Congress meets to count 
the votes, if more modern methods of transmission can be allowed94-it 
would greatly reduce the time during which a Section 4 scenario could even 
arise. If a candidate dies before the Electoral College has convened, the dead 
candidate's electors (presumably in consultation with their party) can coordi-
nate their actions and vote for a different, living candidate without any need 
for congressional authorization through Section 4.95 
To be sure, there are many other factors informing the Electoral College 
schedule besides avoiding Section 4 scenarios. Because contingent elections 
are rare, and because in an ordinary election the Electoral College is simply 
confirming the voters' choices expressed in early November, there is some 
reason to keep the Electoral College's meeting date where it is, or to make it 
even earlier, simply to get the formality over and done with. But there are 
other reasons for moving the meeting date later. Doing so would provide 
more time for resolving disputes like Florida's in the 2000 election. 96 It 
would also reduce other legal risks that populate the time between when the 
Electoral College's members vote and when Congress counts those votes.97 
Moving back the Electoral College's meeting date would greatly reduce 
the risk, but it would not eliminate it. Even if Congress changed the law and 
had the Electoral College convene in early January, there would still be some 
risk of a candidate dying after the electoral votes were cast but before the 
contingent election was concluded.98 Section 4 legislation would still be in 
order. 
B. What Would Happen Without a Law 
Before designing an optimal law, it is worth considering the current 
baseline: what would happen without one? To be sure, it is impossible to 
93 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). The current counting date was set in 1934, shortly after the pas-
sage of the Twentieth Amendment. It had previously been set at the second Wednesday in 
February. See Josephson & Ross, supra note 92, at 176. 
94 Under current law, the electors' votes need to be sent by registered mail. 3 U.S.C. § 6 
(2012). 
95 See supra note 53 and accompanying text; supra note 70 (discussing handling of candi-
date deaths before the Electoral College votes). 
96 See supra note 12. 
97 One such risk is presented by the unresolved question of whether the winning candidate 
becomes president-elect when the electoral votes are cast, or instead not until Congress counts 
those votes. See THE CoNTINUITY OF Gov'r CoMM'N, PRESERVING OuR INSTITUTIONS: THE 
SECOND REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 49 (2009) (recommending 
shortening the time "between the casting of electoral votes and their counting by Congress" 
for this reason); Amar, supra note 85, at 217-18 (exploring the ambiguity of the timing of 
becoming president-elect). 
98 It would similarly reduce the risk if the date on which Congress counted the votes were 
moved back to December. Having the lame-duck Congress count the votes would be problem-
atic for other reasons, though. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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predict any final outcomes, but we can posit where the battle lines would be 
drawn. 
At first glance, it might appear that a candidate death in a contingent 
election would have been harder to settle before Section 4, because it would 
have been unclear not just what could be done but also who could do it. One 
claim might have been that, because each house has the constitutional power 
to make rules for its own proceedings, the House alone would decide how to 
handle a death in a contingent presidential election, and the Senate alone 
would decide how to handle a death in a contingent vice-presidential elec-
tion.99 But whichever side lost the fight over the rules would likely challenge 
that result in court, based on an alternative claim: that the Constitution re-
quired a particular handling of a death in a contingent election, leaving the 
individual houses with no power to alter that outcome. Of course, such liti-
gation would need to resolve the issue of just what outcome the Constitution 
required. 100 In other words, there would be a lot of uncertainty at a very 
inopportune moment. 
Section 4 demoted the one-house rule as an option by making legisla-
tion-with bicameralism and presentment to the president-the proper 
mechanism. Unfortunately, clarifying that legislation is the mechanism does 
not help much when no legislation has been enacted, because any time there 
is a death in a contingent election there can still be a dispute over what the 
constitutional default process is. For instance, the living candidates' support-
ers could claim that in the absence of any legislative authorization for a 
substitution process, the dead candidate's supporters would just be out of 
luck because candidates must be qualified to serve (i.e., be alive) in order to 
receive any votes. 101 For their part, the dead candidate's supporters could 
retort that they can vote for a dead person if they wish. 102 If their dead candi-
date wins, the office would simply be declared vacant, an outcome that 
might be acceptable to them in a number of different political scenarios. 103 
99 See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings"). There are other issues relating to contingent elections that each house might attempt to 
settle with its own rules even now; attempts to settle them through legislation might therefore 
be constitutionally controversial. See Josephson, supra note 4, at 653-57. 
100 One potential complication not yet discussed is that if there is a fourth-place finisher in 
the Electoral College, he or she might claim to be entitled to compete as one of the top three 
(living) vote-getters. Such a claim seems spurious, but it could add another potentially litigious 
party to the mix. See 69 CoNG. REc. 4209 ( 1928) (statement of Rep. Lozier) (raising possibil-
ity of fourth-place finisher moving up). 
101 Cf supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing-and questioning-the Greeley 
precedent against allowing electors to vote for dead people). 
102 Those responsible for Section 4's creation apparently rejected this interpretation. See 
supra note 76. 
103 In a contingent presidential election, a vacancy would work just fine for the dead can-
didate's supporters if they had good prospects for winning the vice presidency-with the presi-
dency vacant, the vice president would succeed to the presidency and all would be well. In a 
contingent vice-presidential election, a vacancy would work just fine if the dead candidate's 
supporters had good prospects for winning the presidency-with the vice presidency vacant, 
the president could appoint a new vice president. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. This would 
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House members might even claim that a House rule is still an option in the 
absence of any Section 4 legislation. 
While passing legislation would preempt such disputes, it would be dif-
ficult to pass legislation in the middle of a contingent election. Interested 
parties would have a strong sense of how the contingent election would play 
out under various scenarios and thus, would only support legislation that 
benefits their interests. It is not difficult to imagine one party benefiting from 
a dead candidate being out of the picture, another party preferring that the 
dead candidate be able to receive votes or to be replaced, and a third party 
profiting from a deadlock. It is hard enough to get legislation through Con-
gress under normal conditions; under these conditions it would be much 
harder. Add to that the possibility that any legislation that passed would 
inevitably face a court challenge, 104 and we can see no clear picture in ad-
vance of what would transpire if a contingent-election candidate were to die. 
Thus it appears that Section 4 has not improved the situation very much 
at all; a death in a contingent election would still be greeted by uncertainty 
and litigation. But this result makes a mockery of Section 4. The uncertainty 
and litigation before Section 4's ratification would have reflected the flawed 
design of the original Constitution. Uncertainty and litigation now, by con-
trast, would come despite the efforts of Section 4's drafters, and would re-
flect Congress's disregard for its assigned constitutional responsibilities. 
Pessimism aside, it is at least possible that a spirit of goodwill and fair 
play would quickly prevail, or at least that the various factions would see 
more to gain from legislating than from litigating. It might even be an ad-
vantage to pass a Section 4 law only in the midst of an actual need for it, 
because that might make it possible to design a perfect process for an idio-
syncratic situation rather than trying to legislate a one-size-fits-all solution in 
advance. But even if such a wonderful episode of good governance should 
come to pass, it is impossible to say what a law would look like that man-
aged to get passed in the midst of a contingent election without knowing the 
prevailing political dynamics at the time. Thus, the rest of this part of the 
Article will present arguments for what an optimal law would look like from 
the standpoint of a Congress trying to legislate in advance of any actual 
contingent election. 
require majority support in the House and Senate, but it would still be better than letting a rival 
occupy the vice presidency. In the meantime, with the vice presidency vacant, the Speaker of 
the House would be next in line for the presidency, and it is fairly likely that any group with 
good prospects for controlling the presidency in this situation would control the speakership as 
well. 
104 To prevail in court, any challengers would not only need to convince the court that they 
were correct on the merits of the constitutional issue, they would also need to convince the 
court in the first instance that the issue did not constitute a non-justiciable "political question." 
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C. Contingent Presidential Elections 
The most prominent reason that Section 4's sponsors had for providing 
for replacement candidates after a death in a contingent election was that 
without one, the supporters of the dead candidate would be disenfranchised. 
In a 1928 debate, Representative Ralph Lozier hearkened to the most recent 
election, in which there had been a strong third-party effort by Robert LaFol-
lette, and then offered this analysis: 
Suppose in the 1924 presidential election no candidate for President 
received a majority and the election in that event would have been thrown 
into the House of Representatives .... [I]f Calvin Coolidge had died ... the 
Republican Party would have been disfranchised, because the present Con-
stitution limits the choice of the House to the three persons receiving the 
highest number of votes in the Electoral College, and the death of Mr. Coo-
lidge would have left no Republican in this list of three, and in that event the 
Republicans in the House would have been compelled to choose between 
John W. Davis and Robert M. La Follette . 
. . . . On the other hand, if no candidate in 1924 had a majority in the 
Electoral College and John W. Davis had died ... , under the present law the 
Democrats in the House could not have voted for any other Democrat .... 
So, gentlemen, we have been tolerating a condition here that is un-American 
and unrepublican and undemocratic, and while this situation has never arisen 
we have no assurance that this condition will not arise some time in the 
future. Why not provide against such an intolerable situation? 
In order to meet this condition the committee of which I am a member 
has added to the Norris resolution section 4, which takes care of a contin-
gency of the kind I have described and provides remedies and methods by 
which the will of the people can be carried out under conditions such as I 
have mentioned. To give effect to the will of the people is the supreme ob-
ject and purpose of all government. 105 
The inspiration for Section 4 was-and thus the essence of any optimal 
Section 4 law would be-to allow a dead candidate's supporters to be repre-
sented as fully as possible in a contingent election. 
With that in mind, I offer three principal approaches to replacing a dead 
candidate in a contingent presidential election: (1) not replacing the candi-
date and instead allowing votes for the dead candidate to be valid, (2) auto-
matically substituting the dead candidate's running mate, and (3) allowing 
the dead candidate's party (ideally working through the dead candidate's 
105 69 CONG. REC. 4206--07 (1928) (statement of Rep. Lozier); accord Hearings on H.J. 
Res. 56, supra note 70, at 24-25 (statement of Rep. Lozier); H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 7 
(1926); 74 CONG. REc. 5877 (1931) (statement of Rep. Gifford); 69 CONG. REc. 4361 (1928) 
(statement of Rep. Lozier). Representative Lozier went further and suggested that such disen-
franchisement could "perhaps precipitate sedition," making Section 4 crucial. 75 CoNG. REc. 
3833 ( 1932) (statement of Rep. Lozier). 
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electors) to confer and name a replacement. I06 Each approach has distinct 
advantages and disadvantages. A fourth option-reconvening the Electoral 
College-merits brief consideration as well. 
1. Option 1: No Replacement 
Allowing votes for the dead candidate is the simplest approach. Not 
least because of the Greeley precedent, 107 it is unclear whether representa-
tives could vote for a dead person in a contingent election without Section 4 
legislation authorizing it. Ios Indeed, as just recounted, Section 4 was 
animated by the very notion that the representatives would not be allowed to 
vote for a dead person. I09 But Section 4 gives Congress a broad power to 
provide for the "case" of a contingent candidate's death, and there is no 
reason that Congress could not choose Option 1 and authorize representa-
tives to vote for the dead candidate. 110 
Under such a system, a vote for the dead candidate would be a vote for 
a vacancy; if the dead candidate won he or she would become a dead presi-
dent-elect. The vice president-elect would take the oath of office as 
president. III 
Besides its swift simplicity (there are none of the disruptions, discussed 
below, that the other methods of replacing a candidate would entail), a key 
advantage of Option 1 is that it tracks the conventional method of dealing 
with presidential death; being replaced by a vice president is exactly what 
happens when a winning candidate dies before inauguration, or dies or be-
comes disabled after inauguration.I 12 It also tracks the conventional approach 
106 Because Section 4 gives Congress the broad power to "provide for the case" of a death 
in a contingent election, Congress might have the constitutional power to pursue other, less 
sensible options, such as giving itself a plenary power to choose replacement candidates, or 
selecting certain congressional leaders as the automatic replacements. Even if such Section 4 
laws were constitutional, though, it is difficult to imagine them passing muster politically. The 
Constitution does not forbid everything in the world that might be bad; it often relies instead 
on the political process it has constructed to filter out the inappropriate and the ill-advised. 
107 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing-and questioning-the Greeley 
precedent). 
108 Beyond the Greeley precedent, the Twelfth Amendment limits contingent presidential 
elections to "persons," a designation that could be interpreted as excluding corpses. Cf Joel K. 
Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 Hous. L. REv. 67, 76 (2010) 
(querying whether the Twelfth Amendment limits electoral votes to living "persons"). But that 
language is not repeated for contingent vice presidential elections, see supra note 32 and ac-
companying text, and in any case there is nothing to stop a majority of the House or Senate 
from simply repudiating the Greeley precedent in such a situation. 
109 See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 7 ("It 
seems certain that votes cast for a dead man could not legally be counted."). 
110 U.S. CoNST. amend. XX, § 4. 
111 See id. § 3. 
112 See id.; id. amend. XXV, § I. There is no direct provision in the Constitution for the 
case of a president-elect who becomes disabled-perhaps too disabled to take the oath of 
office-but does not die. Presumably, though, there would be no reason that the vice presi-
dent-elect could not enter office and then act as president pursuant to Article II, § 1, cl. 6. 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might also be available after inauguration. 
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to the death of other sorts of candidates shortly before an election when it is 
too late to change the ballots. 113 While a contingent presidential election is 
distinguishable from other elections in important ways, 114 dead people have 
run in and won congressional elections with an understanding that their vic-
tory would simply create a vacancy .115 
There are, however, serious disadvantages. First among them is that the 
real result here-having the vice president-elect become president-might 
not be congenial to the dead candidate's supporters. If there is a contingent 
election for president in the House, then there almost certainly would be a 
contingent election for vice president in the Senate, and there is no guarantee 
that the winning vice presidential candidate would be from the same ticket 
as the winning (dead) presidential candidate. Indeed, with three candidates 
in the presidential contest versus two in the vice-presidential one, there is no 
guarantee that the dead candidate's running mate would even participate in 
the vice presidential contest. 
To be sure, that is a feature of double contingent elections anyway, 
without anyone dying; because they are chosen by two different bodies, 
there is always a chance that a contingently elected president and vice presi-
dent will be from different parties. 116 If such a president ever died, the mis-
113 See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § l l-118(c) (West 2014) (providing deadline after 
which dead candidate will appear on the ballot and, if victorious, for a vacancy to be declared); 
Mo. REv. STAT.§ 115.379(2) (2015) (same). 
114 Unlike the normal, state-centered presidential voting process, a contingent election in 
the House would face no real delay in printing and distributing updated ballots, or complica-
tions caused by early and absentee voting. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
115 The most recent notable examples are the 2000 U.S. Senate election in Missouri won 
by Mel Carnahan, and the 2002 U.S. House race in Hawaii won by Patsy Mink. Carnahan died 
in a plane crash shortly before the election, too late to be replaced on the ballot. After the 
governor said that he would appoint Carnahan's widow to fill the vacancy if Carnahan won, 
Missouri's voters handed Carnahan a victory. See Michael G. Adams, Missouri Compromise: 
Did the Posthumous Senatorial Election of Mel Carnahan and Subsequent Appointment of 
Jean Carnahan Compromise Federal or State Law?, 29 N. Kv. L. REV. 433, 433-35 (2002); 
infra note 119. Mink died of pneumonia too late to be replaced on the ballot, but won the 
election, creating a vacancy that was filled later via a special election. See Democrat Wins Last 
House Election, CHI. T1ua., Jan. 6, 2003, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-01-06/news/ 
0301060192_ 1 _rep-patsy-mink-special-election-democrat-ed-case [https://perma.cc/JP7D-
PBP7]. 
116 Using the simplifying assumption that members of Congress would vote for the candi-
dates of their parties, seven of the twenty presidential elections since the adoption of the Twen-
tieth Amendment have yielded a Congress in which neither party commanded both a majority 
of state delegations in the House and a Senate majority. The elections in question were in 1952 
and 2000 (Republican majority of delegations in the House, no majority in the Senate); 1956 
and 1972 (no majority of delegations in the House, Democratic Senate); 1980 (no majority of 
delegations in the House, Republican Senate); 1984 (Democratic majority of delegations in the 
House, Republican Senate); and 2012 (Republican majority of delegations in the House, Dem-
ocratic Senate). 
That simplifying assumption might not hold. Members might vote against their own party's 
candidate if, for instance, a different candidate won the national popular vote, or won the 
popular vote in the member's state or district. They might also vote according to the results of 
political deal-making or even according to personal whim. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Election 1992: 
The Plot Thickens, WASH. PosT, May 20, 1992, at A23 (discussing pressure on representatives 
to vote for the winner of their state or district, even if from another party); Tribe & Rollins, 
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matched vice president would take over. But such mismatches are best 
avoided if possible. Put another way, giving a dead candidate's supporters 
the ability to put another party's candidate in office does not really meet 
Section 4' s anti-disenfranchisement goal. 
The second, related disadvantage is that it handicaps a campaign when 
its standard bearer is dead. It is one thing to give a dead candidate's support-
ers representation. It is quite another to limit that representation to voting for 
a corpse who can never serve as president. While it is hard to say for sure 
given the thinness of the record, Section 4's framers seemingly had this no-
tion in mind. Section 4 was motivated by the concern that representatives 
would be unable to vote for the dead candidate. 117 But the framers' complaint 
was not the technicality of being unable to vote for a dead candidate; if it 
had been, the amendment simply could have authorized that. Rather, the 
problem was the reality of being unable to vote for a live candidate; the key 
intention of Section 4 was to allow substitutions. 118 As a result, Option 1 
does not get to the heart of what Section 4 was meant to accomplish. 
On the other hand, the opposite problem is worth remembering, and it 
represents one important benefit of Option I. While a campaign is handi-
capped by having a dead standard bearer, it gives a campaign something of 
an unfair advantage if it can introduce a shiny new candidate in the middle 
of a hard-fought contingent election. Particularly if the party can choose 
whomever it wants (Option 3), it can ride a wave of sympathy surrounding 
the dead candidate at the same time that it trots out a new candidate unsul-
lied-and unvetted-by the preceding campaign. 119 While Section 4 is sup-
posed to give a dead candidate's supporters some representation in a 
contingent election, it should not give them too much of an advantage. 
supra note 35, at 58--60 (outlining various possible bases for representatives' voting decisions 
in a contingent election). In 2000, multiple Democrats in districts that had supported Republi-
can George W. Bush indicated that they would vote for Bush if the election were thrown into 
the House. See John Berlau and Sean Higgins, 'Go-For-It' Gore Backers In Congress Now Talk 
More About Exit Strategies, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 6, 2000, at A22. 
117 See supra note l02 and accompanying text. 
118 See, e.g., Hearings on H.J. Res. 56, supra note 70, at 25 (statement of Rep. Lozier) 
("In an emergency such as I have indicated, the Representatives of the political party to which 
the deceased candidate belonged may cast their ballots for some living representative of that 
party."). 
119 The Missouri race for U.S. Senate in 2000 provides an analogy. Incumbent John Ash-
croft held a small lead over his opponent Mel Carnahan in the polls. When Carnahan died in a 
plane crash, though, Ashcroft felt the need to step back from campaigning. The governor 
promised to appoint Carnahan's politically inexperienced widow Jean to fill the vacant seat if 
Carnahan (who remained on the ballot) won, which he did. When Jean Carnahan faced an 
actual campaign two years later, she was defeated (though admittedly, many other factors had 
changed between 2000 and 2002). See William Claiborne, Carnahan Apparent Winner in Mis-
souri, WASH. PosT, Nov. 8, 2000, at A37; Deirdre Shesgreen & Jo Mannies, Talent Wins Nail-
Biter, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2002, at Al. 
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2. Option 2: Automatic Replacement by the Running Mate 
The second option is for a dead presidential candidate in a contingent 
election to be replaced automatically by his or her running mate. Senator 
Simon's proposed legislation chose this approach. 120 
This method answers both of the disadvantages of Option 1 discussed 
above: it avoids the possibility of a vice president piggybacking off of an-
other party's victory, and it gives the dead candidate's supporters a more 
viable (in both senses of the word) object of their support. 
The automatic-replacement method also respects-and promotes-the 
key role of the running mate as understudy. Using the running mate in this 
way tracks the standard method of replacing dead or disabled presidents 121 
and dead presidents-elect. 122 As standard methods go it is a good one; it 
provides efficiency and certainty, and thus stability. Its automatic nature 
would also avoid delay, a helpful characteristic during a contingent election. 
Option 2 also minimizes the opportunity for strategic behavior that 
would arise under Option 3 (if the dead candidate's party and electors were 
able to name anyone they liked as a replacement). With Option 3, the surviv-
ing candidates' parties could offer inducements to the dead candidate's party 
to name a particular replacement-either a weak one, or perhaps even one of 
the other two candidates. Such behavior would corrupt the election 
process. 123 
Critics might contend that it is inappropriate to let Congress open the 
door to new candidates, because the Constitution provides that contingent 
elections feature only the top electoral-vote recipients; the running mate typ-
ically would not have received any electoral votes for president. To these 
critics, only Option 1 properly respects the Electoral College and its votes. 
But this objection overlooks the core purpose of Section 4: to amend the 
120 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
121 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 6; id. amend. XXY. 
122 See id. amend. XX, § 3; c.f supra note 112 (discussing the Twentieth Amendment's 
lack of provision for disabled presidents-elect). 
123 See Tribe & Rollins, supra note 35, at 52, 56-57 (describing history of political bar-
gaining and prospect of future such bargaining, to resolve deadlocked presidential elections). 
As the Tribe & Rollins article makes clear, bargaining is part of the political process, and the 
very design of contingent elections reflects a desire to have legislators-politicians-choose 
the president or vice president. In any case, depending on what sorts of arrangements are 
made, they might not be literally corrupt. 
That said, the modern ideal of presidential elections is that they are rooted in democratic 
practice, not oligarchy. Even though contingent elections give members of Congress the power 
to choose the president and vice president, those members are ultimately accountable to the 
voters for their choices. In a related vein, consider the last contingent presidential election, in 
1825. John Quincy Adams won with the support of fourth-place candidate and Speaker of the 
House Henry Clay, whom he then appointed Secretary of State. Defeated candidate Andrew 
Jackson denounced this as a "corrupt bargain," and beat that drum constantly as his partisans 
took over the House in 1826 and as he defeated Adams for president in 1828. See Michael 
Daly Hawkins, John Quincy Adams and the Antebellum Maritime Slave Trade: The Politics of' 
Slavery and the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. I, 24-26, 34-35 (2000). 
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constitutional structure and allow substitutes for dead candidates. 124 And 
while it is problematic to allow too much noodling around with the candi-
date list, an automatic replacement by the running mate-who will have 
received electoral votes specifically to be the dead candidate's understudy-
is the least intrusive, least abusive way to do it. 
A more practical disadvantage to letting the running mate fill in is that 
the running mate probably would also be running for vice president in a 
contingent election in the Senate. As mentioned already, it is highly likely 
that when there is no outright winner of the presidential election, there will 
be no outright winner of the vice-presidential election either. Unless the 
dead presidential candidate's ticket finished in third place-in which case it 
would be represented in the contingent presidential election but not the con-
tingent vice-presidential election-having the running mate fill in would 
mean either creating a vacancy in the Senate's vice-presidential election or 
letting the running mate run in both contests. 
Neither situation should be a deal-breaker, though. Filling a vacancy in 
the vice-presidential election (the next subject considered below) is a per-
fectly feasible task, and would be appropriate if the House concluded its 
contingent election first and the running mate won it. Running in both elec-
tions simultaneously is workable as well. If the running mate loses one or 
both of the contingent elections, then there is no real problem. If the running 
mate wins both elections, he or she would just become president-elect and 
there would be no vice president-elect until after inauguration, when he or 
she could appoint a vice president with Congress's approval. 125 To be sure, 
the fact that running in both elections is technically possible does not pre-
vent it from being awkward. But if it would be too awkward to countenance, 
the running mate simply could be replaced in the contingent vice-presiden-
tial election. 
3. Option 3: Party/Elector Selection of a Replacement 
The third option is to permit the dead candidate's party126 to name a 
replacement, ideally working through the members of the Electoral College 
124 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
125 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXY, § 2 (providing for filling vice-presidential vacancies). 
The president-elect could announce a vice-presidential nominee before being inaugurated so 
that Congress could begin its consideration of the nomination in advance, allowing a success-
ful nominee to enter the job as soon as possible after inauguration day. 
This raises another possible legislative design, suggested to me by Barbara Bean: if the 
House moves first and the running mate wins there, the Senate would cancel its contingent 
vice-presidential election and allow the new president to appoint a vice president. Because it 
would avoid the possibility of a vice president from a different party than the president, this 
might be a good design for all contingent elections. Unfortunately, such noodling around with 
the design of contingent elections is only possible when a candidate dies and Section 4's broad 
grant of power to Congress kicks in. 
126 This section operates under the assumption that the dead candidate was running as the 
nominee of an established party, as opposed to running as an independent or with an upstart, 
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who had voted for the dead candidate. As with Option 2, this avoids the 
possibility of a victory handing power to another party's vice-presidential 
candidate, and it produces a truly viable candidate. Unlike Option 2, it po-
tentially avoids the awkwardness of either causing a vacancy in the contin-
gent vice-presidential election or requiring a candidate to run for both 
president and vice president at the same time. 
Allowing the party to choose a replacement candidate is also consistent 
with what would happen if a presidential candidate died before the Electoral 
College met to vote. Both major parties provide that if a nominee dies (or 
withdraws), the national committee convenes to quickly name a replace-
ment. I27 If this happens well before the election, and there is plenty of time 
to replace the dead candidate's name on the ballot, the process is relatively 
seamless. If the dead candidate is on the ballot-either because the death 
occurs too close to Election Day' 28 or because it occurs after Election Day 
but before the Electoral College meets-things are a bit more complicated. 
But while state ballot laws can be intricate, there is nothing in the Constitu-
tion that precludes a party from coordinating replacements right up to the 
day that the Electoral College votes, and there are obvious and powerful 
incentives for the party to do so instead of just letting things fall apart. Given 
that the electors are chosen for their loyalty to the party, they can be ex-
pected to follow the party's choice. I29 
When the framers of the Twentieth Amendment contemplated the entire 
timeline of possible pitfalls stemming from candidate deaths, they decided 
that there was no reason for them to address pre-election situations, because 
they were content to leave those informally to whatever methods the parties 
chose for themselves. 130 The parties had no such power in the middle of a 
contingent election, though, because the Constitution specifically limits who 
the candidates there can be. 131 Section 4 gives Congress the ability to extend 
the parties' replacement power to contingent elections, if that is what Con-
gress thinks is best. 
relatively unorganized party. The ramifications of the latter situations are explored in Section 
III.E.4, infra. 
127 See Fordham Clinic, supra note 51, at 48--49 (citing major party rules in force in 2012); 
see also VINCENT A. DOYLE & RITA ANN REIMER, CONG. RES. SERV., 76-21 lA, DEATH oF A 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OR PRESIDENT-ELricr 2 & n.4 (1976) (quoting party rules as of 
1976). Most recently, the Democratic National Committee scrambled to name Sargent Shriver 
as the Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 1972 after the first nominee, Thomas Eagleton, 
withdrew. See NEIL A. HAMILTON, THE 1970s, at 113 (2006). 
128 With the expansion of absentee voting and early voting, the deadlines for replacing 
candidates have become much earlier. See Barry C. Burden & Brian J. Gaines, Presidential 
Commission on Election Administration: Absentee and Early Voting: Weighing the Costs of 
Convenience, 14 ELECTION L.J. 32, 33 (2015). 
129 See, e.g., supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing handling of James Sher-
man's death in the Election of 1912); see also H.R. REP. No. 69-311, at 6 (1926); note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
130 See H.R. Rrn>. No. 69-311, at 6; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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The question remains, though, whether this actually is best. Is a death 
during a contingent election more like a death before Election Day (in which 
case party replacement is the recognized approach), or more like a death 
afterwards (in which case the running mate is supposed to step in)?132 It 
might seem obvious that it is the former when the death occurs before the 
day of the contingent election. But contingent elections are not the same as 
regular elections; rather, they are a species of runoff election. The rules for 
substitution in a runoff could well be different because a runoff is a continu-
ation of an election already held-held, in this case, before the dead candi-
date was dead. Given that fact, the running mate-part of the ticket that 
"won" the first round of voting in the sense that it advanced to the second 
round-is a more legitimate replacement than is some stranger to the elec-
tion who has no such standing. 
Of course, a primary advantage of letting the party choose a replace-
ment is flexibility; in cases where running mates are the most logical 
replacements, the party would be free to choose them. If the party chooses 
anyone other than the running mate, it will have some serious explaining to 
do to the House-why are they declaring that the running mate is not good 
enough to contend for the presidency, given that they had previously deemed 
the running mate to be the best person to succeed to the presidency if the 
president died after inauguration?133 
Another problem with Option 3 is that, as already discussed, it could be 
unfair and unwise to give the party a "do-over," letting it select a candidate 
who would not have faced the same bruising campaign or the same vetting 
132 Cf Amar, supra note 85, at 223 (arguing that candidate deaths any time after Election 
Day should be handled with the same standards as deaths after Inauguration Day). Amar ar-
gues in favor of what this Article calls Option I-allowing voting for the dead candidate and, 
if he or she wins, declaring the office vacant and having his or her running mate take over. See 
id. at 224. But Amar is not writing about contingent elections, in which the presidential winner 
and vice-presidential winner can be from different parties. See supra note 116 and accompany-
ing text. 
133 There are all sorts of reasons why the running mate might not actually be the second-
best person for the job in the party's eyes. While "balancing the ticket" politically has not 
distorted tickets recently as much as it used to, it is still a factor. See Joel K. Goldstein, The 
New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 505, 549 (1995) ("Increas-
ingly, the Vice President has become, in theory and practice, an integral part of the executive 
branch, chosen by, compatible with, and working closely with the Chief Executive."); Richard 
Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 873 (2005) ("Rather than select-
ing a vice presidential nominee for her preparedness to assume the Presidency and her tested 
ability to wield the escalating power of the Vice Presidency, a presidential nominee is more 
likely to pick her running mate for strategic purposes of ticket balancing, which generally 
means selecting a vice presidential candidate whose background generally complements or 
supplements her own resume."). Another political possibility is that the party believes that a 
particular person has a better chance at winning the contingent presidential election than the 
running mate would, even if the running mate was a better choice for the general election and 
even if the running mate would make a better president. 
132 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 54 
as the other two candidates. 134 Using the running mate as a substitute as in 
Option 2 avoids this problem. 135 
Also as already discussed, it might be seen as disrespectful to the Elec-
toral College, or perhaps even illegitimate, to open the door to new candi-
dates who were not among the top presidential electoral-vote recipients. 136 
The same response works here: Section 4 was meant to amend the constitu-
tional structure to allow substitutions. 137 Nevertheless, it would add constitu-
tional legitimacy to the process for the electors who had voted for the dead 
candidate to make the formal choice here rather than the party (an entity 
that, unlike the Electoral College, is not clearly recognized by the Constitu-
tion). Presumably, the party would still take the lead in coordinating the 
choice; again, the electors are chosen for their party loyalty, and so would 
typically follow along. 138 
Option 3's flexibility has other drawbacks compared to Option 2. One is 
that it sacrifices the swiftness and certainty that Option 2's automaticity 
would offer. Swiftness and certainty are hallmarks of sensible succession 
planning. 139 Granted, it is not as important to have swift, certain succession 
for presidential candidates as it is for presidents. But with Congress given 
only two weeks to select a president before the term begins, 140 time would be 
at a premium, and giving parties and electors even a few days to make their 
choices could be costly. 
Moreover, there are good reasons to minimize uncertainty even for can-
didates. One is that certainty may dampen the incentive to assassinate a can-
didate.141 Another is that automatic replacement reduces the opportunities for 
backroom wheeling and dealing that the party-selection method would en-
tail.142 The undemocratic "smoke-filled room" method of selecting candi-
dates has long since been replaced by our more-accountable system of 
presidential primaries. To be sure, running mates are not selected through a 
similarly accountable system; there is no vice-presidential primary. But Op-
tion 2 recognizes that the running mate represents the party's (and the candi-
134 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra Section III.C.2. 
136 See supra text accompanying note 124. 
137 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
138 It would make sense to require only a majority of the electors to make a choice of 
substitutes. This would allow the process to work more quickly and to avoid being tripped up 
by the unavailability of some small number of electors. It also would help work through situa-
tions in which the dead candidate had no party or a disorganized one. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 167-68. 
139 Cf Kalt, supra note 88, at 62-63. 
140 Under current law, Congress counts the electoral votes on January 6, two weeks before 
the constitutionally mandated start of the presidential term on January 20. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XX, § 1; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). Congress could, if it wanted, legislate an earlier counting day. 
See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing disincentivizing 
assassination). 
142 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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date's) choice for the specific role of understudy, and the running mate will 
at least have been anointed by the party convention, voters, and members of 
the Electoral College. 
On a final note, because the major parties are led by committees com-
prising many members, and because time would be of the essence, it would 
be helpful for the party to have spelled out a candidate-replacement process 
in advance. 
4. Reconvening the Electoral College 
Another option is possible besides replacing candidates: reconvening 
the entire Electoral College and having a completely new vote. Section 4's 
framers apparently considered this possibility .143 This route might be particu-
larly attractive to those concerned about the other options' detour around the 
Electoral College. 144 It also is a good choice for those who would want to 
give every candidate's supporters a chance to do things differently in. the 
wake of one candidate's death. 
In most cases, the results of this option would be the same as Option 3, 
only with more delay and inconvenience. 145 When the electors reconvened, 
one would expect the living candidates' electors to vote the same way, and 
for the dead candidate's electors to vote for the person that the party had 
coordinated as the designated replacement. That would put the House in the 
same place as Option 3, except that all of the electors (not just the dead 
candidates' ones) would have to have gotten involved, and there would be 
more opportunities for intrigue. 
The result could be different, though. First, if enough of the dead candi-
date's electors were to vote for one of the living candidates, someone might 
win a majority and the contingent election could be avoided. Alternatively, 
enough electors could vote for a candidate who previously had finished 
outside of the top three, thereby prompting a new contingent election with a 
different party lineup. (The living candidates would have a chance to change 
their votes too, and similarly could cause someone to win a majority or 
someone new to move into the top three.) To be sure, under Option 3 the 
dead candidates' party could choose one of the other, living candidates as 
their preferred replacement, and this might expedite that living candidate's 
143 See supra note 76. Some people, in a Section 4 scenario, might like to take the oppor-
tunity just to jettison the Electoral College and contingent elections. Since Section 4 gives 
Congress a blank check to provide a new process at that point, such people might argue, why 
not mandate a national popular vote for president? This Article starts from a different prefer-
ence-that Section 4 legislation should try to work within the current system-and from an 
assumption that Congress would share that preference. In any case, the rare, harrowing situa-
tion of a contingent election and a candidate death does not present much of an opportunity for 
real reform of the overall electoral process. 
144 See supra text accompanying notes 124, 136-38. 
145 The desire to mitigate that delay might spur reconsideration of the current, slow system 
for electors to vote and have their choices transmitted to Congress. See supra note 97 and 
accompanying text. 
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victory, but it would not necessarily play out the same way a total revote 
would. 
In a second potential difference from Option 3, the dead candidates' 
electors might split between two or more replacement candidates. Such a 
splintering could have several different unfortunate effects on the resulting 
new contingent election. If the party chose a replacement candidate via a 
splintered vote, the replacement might have only plurality support, which 
seems undesirable. 146 Also undesirable would be if the splintering elevated a 
fourth-place candidate into third place and thereby eliminated the dead can-
didate's party from contention; that would contravene Section 4's goal of 
preserving the dead candidate's representation. Perhaps the worst result of 
splintering would be if the dead candidate had won enough electoral votes 
that the resulting splinters were large enough to eliminate one or even both 
of the living candidates from the new contingent election. 147 Section 4 is 
supposed to protect a party from being eliminated when its candidate dies; 
eliminating another party's candidate instead-perhaps intentionally-
surely would be inconsistent with that purpose. 
D. Contingent Vice-Presidential Elections 
The landscape of potential solutions is simpler when it comes to replac-
ing a dead vice-presidential candidate in a contingent election. There are no 
formally designated understudies for vice-presidential candidates, so the op-
tions are reduced to two: Option 1, allowing votes for the dead candidate and 
declaring a vacancy if he or she wins; or Option 3, allowing the party (ide-
ally with the approval of the dead candidate's electors) to name a replace-
ment candidate. 
Option 1, the no-replacement method, again enjoys the advantages of 
simplicity and directness. But the disadvantages are even greater here than 
for contingent presidential elections. While it is always important for there 
to be a vice president, it has special importance in the context of a contingent 
election. If the winner of the contingent vice-presidential election is dead, 
there will not be a vjce president-elect; and there will not be a vice president 
until a new president is sworn in, nominates a vice president, and has that 
nominee confirmed by the House and Senate. This gap is of course problem-
atic because of the possibility that the president-elect/President will die in 
146 See supra note 138 (discussing a majority requirement under Option 3). 
147 To eliminate one of the living candidates, the dead candidate's party would need to 
yield two splinters with more electoral votes than the (previous) third-place candidate. Elimi-
nating both living candidates would require a more fractured result. Using the size of the 
current Electoral College (538 electoral votes) as an example, a contingent-election candidate 
could have won a maximum of 269 electoral votes. Splitting that into three splinters that finish 
in first, second, and third place, the largest the third splinter could be is 89 electoral votes. If 
the (previous) second-place candidate had fewer than 89 electoral votes, there would need to 
have been at least five candidates who won electoral votes-something that has never hap-
pened in the post-Twelfth Amendment era. 
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the meantime. 148 But it is even more problematic because of the crucial role 
that the vice president-elect plays in contingent-election scenarios. As dis-
cussed above, the Senate's vice-presidential election provides a crucial back-
stop in case the House deadlocks and cannot choose a president before the 
term begins. 149 In a sense the system relies on the Senate's contingent elec-
tion to produce a living winner, and Option 1 compromises that goal. Option 
3 is preferable. 150 
As with the presidential case, it would add constitutional legitimacy to 
the process to have the dead candidate's electors make the official substitu-
tion, 151 even though the party presumably would be coordinating the choice 
along with the party's presidential candidate. (On that note, the law could 
give the presidential candidate the sole power to name a replacement candi-
date, rather than running the process through his or her party.) Reconvening 
the Electoral College remains as a possibility as well, subject to the same 
issues discussed previously .152 
E. Special Cases and Other Issues 
Before choosing from among the methods discussed above, there are 
additional factors and contingencies to consider. 
I. Multiple Deaths 
It might happen that both a party's contingent presidential and contin-
gent vice-presidential candidates die. In such a case, there would be no way 
for the presidential candidate to be replaced automatically by his or her ru_n-
ning mate; Option 2 is out. Option 1 would be undesirable as well. If the 
dead candidates' party was able to win in both the contingent presidential 
and vice-presidential elections, there would be a double vacancy and the 
next president would be drawn from further down the line of succession: the 
Speaker of the House. 153 Speaker succession is problematic from the stand-
points of both constitutional law and public policy. 154 Option 3-allowing 
the naming of some other substitute-is thus preferable when both halves of 
the ticket are dead. 
148 See supra note 72 and accompanying text; infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 29-35. If the House chooses a president first this 
presents the possibility of a third alternative here: canceling the Senate's contingent vice-presi-
dential election altogether. See supra note 125. 
150 Senator Simon's proposed Section 4 legislation took this approach. See supra note 83 
and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra Section 111.C.4. 
153 See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012) (providing presidential line of succession); see also supra 
note 72 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra note 72; see also Kalt, supra note 88, at 83-105. 
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Another complicated possibility is for there to be deaths on more than 
one ticket. If both vice-presidential candidates die, there would be no candi-
dates at all unless there was some way for the parties to make substitutions. 
This would mean no vice president-elect, which is obviously problematic. 155 
If multiple presidential candidates in a contingent election die, this 
would present a complication mainly just under Option 1. Under Option 1, if 
a dead presidential candidate wins a contingent election there is a vacancy 
and the winning vice-presidential candidate becomes president on inaugura-
tion day. But if there is more than one dead presidential candidate, the elec-
tion could be deadlocked even if a solid majority of state delegations prefer 
the same result. Imagine that ten states' delegations vote for Dead Candidate 
1, ten more vote for Dead Candidate 2, and another ten are deadlocked but 
have a majority voting for either Dead Candidate 1 or 2. In such a case, 
thirty states' delegations would have a majority in favor of having the vice-
presidential winner become president. Instead of actually reaching that re-
sult, however, the presidential election would remain deadlocked unless the 
two factions could unite sufficiently behind one of their dead candidates. 
Of course, if such a deadlock were to persist up to inauguration day, the 
vice president-elect would act as president, a result that might seem to give 
the majority what it wanted. But the fact that the contingent presidential 
election would continue could make a very real difference. The Acting Presi-
dent would, for the entirety of the term, face the possibility of the House 
breaking the deadlock by voting for the remaining (living) candidate. The 
living candidate would have an incentive to maintain a constant campaign 
against the Acting President, who would have to execute his powers with the 
knowledge that the House could, with a single vote at any moment, remove 
him from office in favor of the living candidate. 156 While one would hope 
that the dead candidates' factions would just coordinate their votes and avoid 
this possibility, Options 2 and 3 would just eliminate the risk altogether. 
2. Timing and Combination Options 
Section 4 could apply any time a candidate died between the day the 
Electoral College members cast their votes (with no one winning a majority) 
and the conclusion of the contingent election or elections (with someone 
winning the presidency and/or vice presidency ). 157 Currently, the Electoral 
155 See supra text accompanying notes 29-35. 
156 See Tribe & Rollins, supra note 35, at 60--61 (discussing the prospect of an unsettled 
contingent election holding the acting president's agenda hostage at least until the midterm 
elections). A vice president only acting as president also would be unable to nominate a vice 
president to back him or her up. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, * 2 (allowing nominations of 
vice presidents only when the vice presidency is vacant). 
157 It could conceivably kick in earlier if electors vote for someone who is already dead, 
and if Congress counts those votes despite the Greeley precedent. See supra note 48 and ac-
companying text (describing-and questioning-the Greeley precedent); see also Amar, supra 
note 85, at 222, 228-29, 229 n.20 (noting the Twentieth Amendment's failure to explicitly 
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College votes between December 13 and December 19. 158 On the other end, 
there is no outside limit for a contingent election. Ideally, it would be con-
cluded before the presidential term starts on January 20, but the Twentieth 
Amendment recognizes that a serious deadlock might mean that a choice is 
not made until later, if at all. 159 
Different options for replacing a dead candidate might make more or 
less sense at different times in the process. The main question is urgency. 
The earlier in the process that candidates die, the more time there is to re-
place them; this makes Option 3 more attractive in December than it is in 
January. The later in the process a death occurs-after the contingent elec-
tion begins, and especially as inauguration day draws near-the more impor-
tant it is to avoid delay. Option 2's automaticity is thus particularly attractive 
later in the game, as is Option 1 's lack of change. Option 3' s potential for 
delay, on the other hand, becomes increasingly problematic. The same is 
true, even more so, for reconvening the Electoral College. 
But Option 3's weakness here is not an unsolvable problem. Section 4 
legislation that enacts Option 3 could easily provide a time limit for a party 
and its electors to make their choice. (Eliminating the electors' participation 
would speed things up too, but would be undesirable for other reasons. 160) 
Option 3 could also provide a backup provision for when the party and its 
electors do not make a choice in time. For instance, the legislation could say 
that once the contingent-election process has begun, the electors have no 
more than 72 hours to designate a replacement for a dead candidate. For 
contingent presidential elections, the legislation could mandate either Option 
1 or Option 2 when a party and its electors do not make a choice in time. For 
vice-presidential elections, it could mandate Option 1 when too much time 
has passed. In the alternative, in either case, the legislation could be even 
tougher and say that when a party and its electors fail to make a timely 
substitution, they simply lose their spot in the election. 
3. End of Life Issues 
A thornier issue is posed by Section 4' s lack of provision for candidates 
who are somehow incapacitated-in a coma or a vegetative state, perhaps-
repudiate the Greeley precedent). Amar advocates legislation to formally reject the Greeley 
precedent. Id. at 222. 
It also might kick in only later, if Congress were to extend the Greeley precedent by refus-
ing to count votes cast for a candidate who died after the Electoral College cast its votes but 
before Congress counted them. There is no reason for Congress to do that, though, given that 
the votes would have been valid when cast. 
158 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
159 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (providing for the House's failure to choose a presi-
dent by the beginning of the term); cf Tribe & Rollins, supra note 35, at 52 (discussing last-
minute resolution of the disputed Election of 1876). 
160 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. 
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rather than dead. Because Section 4 only allows legislation in the case of a 
death, these marginal cases raise difficult issues. 
If a presidential candidate is incapacitated but not dead, and thus Sec-
tion 4 cannot apply to allow a replacement, then things would proceed in a 
manner similar to Option I. Incapacitated candidates would stay on the bal-
lot and, if they won, pass power to the vice-presidential winner. But as al-
ready discussed, Option I is problematic because the vice-presidential 
winner might be from another party, and because it does not allow for as 
vigorous a campaign by as viable a candidate. This would put parties in an 
awkward position in which, if Option 2 or 3 were enacted, they would be 
much better off if the candidate died. If there were end-of-life decisions to 
be made, there would thus be a heightened incentive for the candidate's fam-
ily to "pull the plug," and to do so quickly. This is unfortunate and un-
seemly, but because Section 4 only applies to deaths, there is no way around 
it when Options 2 or 3 apply instead of Option I. 
Incapacitated vice-presidential candidates pose a different problem that 
does not resemble Option I as much. Once again, Section 4 would offer no 
possibility of replacing a candidate who is incapacitated but still alive. But if 
an incapacitated vice-presidential candidate were to win, he or she would be 
the vice president-elect; there would not be a vacancy to be filled as with a 
victorious-but-dead candidate under Option I. From a crass political per-
spective, there would be a significant benefit from the candidate's death and 
significant detriment associated with the candidate's survival into office. 
For both presidential and vice-presidential candidates, there is also the 
potential for disputes over whether a candidate actually is dead. If a candi-
date is missing but not all hope of rescue has been lost, or if a candidate is 
arguably but not certainly brain dead, there could be a fight between sup-
porters who wish to replace the candidate with a more viable and promising 
stand-in (these supporters, not coincidentally, would find themselves sud-
denly advocating more liberal definitions of "death") and opponents who 
would want to keep the candidate on the ballot (these supporters, not coinci-
dentally, would find themselves suddenly sympathetic to very restrictive or 
conservative definitions of "death"). It might be useful for Section 4 legisla-
tion to provide a process for answering these questions-perhaps by 
designating a particular court that could issue a declaratory judgment when 
such questions arose-to provide some clarity and certainty as swiftly as 
possible. In the absence of any such provisions, though, it would certainly 
make sense to require an official declaration of death by the applicable local 
authorities. 
4. Weak Party Structure 
So far, this discussion has assumed that the election in question would 
reflect the usual partisan structure: national political parties nominating a 
ticket with a presidential candidate and a vice-presidential candidate. It 
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would be imprudent, however, to assume that this would necessarily be the 
case. This is especially so given that some of the more likely scenarios 
spawning a contingent election would involve a breakdown of the usual 
party dynamics. 161 
Though the Election of 1992 ended with a decisive Electoral College 
majority for Bill Clinton, it appeared at times during the campaign that there 
might be no outright winner because of the strong independent candidacy of 
Ross Perot. 162 As late as June, Perot led in the polls and it was easy to imag-
ine him throwing the election into the House if not winning outright. 163 After 
running a campaign that could be charitably described as quirky, Perot fin-
ished with 19% of the popular vote (the most for a third-party candidate 
since 1912) but no electoral votes. 164 
But what if Perot had won some electoral votes-enough to deprive 
Clinton of an Electoral College majority and throw the election into the 
House of Representatives-and had then died? With no Section 4 legislation 
on the books, it is hard to say for sure what would have happened. Given 
that there were hundreds of Democrats and Republicans in Congress and 
zero professed Perot supporters, it is questionable whether anyone within 
Congress would have wanted to push hard for Section 4 legislation that 
would have kept Perot's ticket in the running. That said, the sizable chunk of 
the electorate that had voted for this hypothetical Perot (along with any part 
of the remainder who were deeply concerned about fair play) might have 
pushed hard for some sort of accommodation. 165 
Even if Perot's supporters could have gotten legislation through, how-
ever, their options would have been constrained, because Perot had no for-
mal party organization. Option 3, therefore, would not have been feasible. 
There was no party apparatus that could have convened to select a replace-
ment candidate because the party apparatus was basically Perot himself. 166 
This provides an additional reason to make sure that if Option 3 is used, 
it is run through the dead candidate's electors. While the discussion of Op-
tion 3 assumed that the party would coordinate a choice and its members of 
161 See supra note 10. 
162 See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, And If Perot Produces a Deadlock? The House Will Decide, 
N. Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992, at A 18; supra note 83 (discussing 1992 introduction of a House 
resolution to convene an expert panel to consider procedures for a contingent election). 
163 See, e.g., Poll Gives Perot a Clear Lead, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1992, at Al8 (reporting 
poll showing Perot at 39%, Bush at 31 %, and Clinton at 25%). 
164 See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 354-55 (Michael Nelson 
ed., 5th ed. 2013) (describing Perot campaign); 1992 Presidential General Election Results, 
DAVE LmP's ATLAS OF u .s. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ 
national.php?year= 1992 [https://perma.cc/H4QF-UT2E]. 
165 C.f supra note 116 (discussing different possible bases for representatives' voting deci-
sions in a contingent presidential election). 
166 See Thomas V. DiBacco, In Defense of Party Politics, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 7, 
1992, at GI (describing, and criticizing, Perot's lack of a formal party organization). Perot 
formed the Reform Party in 1995 and ran as its nominee in 1996. See GumE TO THE PRESI-
DENCY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra note 164, at 355. 
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the Electoral College would follow along, 167 using the electors would allow 
for substitutions even when there is no central party authority-assuming 
that the electors could reach consensus quickly enough. In a similar vein, 
making use of the electors also helps resolve situations in which a candidate 
is running under the banner of multiple political parties. Rather than attempt 
'to define the candidate's one true party, we could just advert to the 
electors. 168 
Relatedly, the lack of a party structure makes the option of reconvening 
the Electoral College somewhat more attractive. Recall the problem with a 
revote that the dead candidate's electors might support another candidate, or 
splinter and let a fourth-place finisher sneak into the mix. 169 That is a prob-
lem to the extent that the point of Section 4 is to prevent a dead candidate's 
supporters from being disenfranchised in a contingent election. But to the 
extent that dead candidate's movement is not cohesive enough to make a 
clear choice, the fact that a revote might promote a candidate outside the 
movement could actually be a good thing. 
Option 2-substituting Perot's running mate, James Stockdale-would 
still have been possible in 1992, but for similar reasons there would have 
been no party apparatus to coordinate the electors' choice to replace Stock-
dale in the contingent vice-presidential election in the Senate if that were 
necessary. 
This, along with other examples of strong third-candidate presidential 
runs that lacked formal party organization, 170 shows that Section 4 legislation 
should not assume that the dead candidate necessarily has a "party." This 
does not take Option 3 off the table, but it underscores the importance of 
167 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
168 On a tangential note, a multiple-party run might cloud the question under Option 2 of 
who a dead candidate's running mate is. In 1896, William Jennings Bryan ran with Arthur 
Sewall (who won 149 electoral votes) on the Democratic ticket, but with Thomas Watson (who 
won 27 electoral votes) on the People's Party or Populist ticket. See STEPHEN W. STATHIS, 
LANDMARK LEGISLATION, 1774-2002, at 142 (2003). If a similar election were thrown into the 
House and the Bryan-type candidate died, and if Option 2 were used, there would need to be a 
way to define who the "running mate" was. The running mate who received the most electoral 
votes from the dead candidate's electors (in 1896, Sewall) seems like the most obvious choice 
(perhaps with a tiebreaker, if needed, based on the number of associated popular votes). 
169 See supra Section III.C.4. 
170 See GUIDE TO THE PRESlDENCY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra note 164, 
at 354-55 (noting deficiency of party organization surrounding independent presidential cam-
paigns in 1968, 1976, and 1980). One notable example is 1960, in which Harry Byrd received 
fifteen electoral votes without having run for president. Fourteen of Byrd's votes came from 
Democratic "unpledged electors": people who ran successfully for the office of elector in 
Alabama and Mississippi without committing to vote for John F. Kennedy. Byrd's fifteenth 
vote came from a faithless Oklahoma elector pledged to Richard Nixon. 1960 Presidential 
General Election Results, DAYE LE1P's ATLAS OF U.S. PRESlDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselec-
tionatlas.org/RESUL TS/national.php?year= 1960 [https://perma.cc/J4NH-4WZT]. The elec-
tion was close; a national shift in the popular vote of 0.53% toward Nixon would have cost 
Kennedy his electoral-college majority, but with Byrd's fifteen votes Nixon would not have 
had a majority either. If Byrd had died during the contingent election, there would have been 
no appropriate party to nominate a replacement; although Byrd was a Democrat, the unpledged 
electors' whole point was to buck the Democratic party line. 
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having the electors make the formal choice of a substitute. The electors 
would have to be able to make an appropriate and swift choice without any 
central coordinating authority, so any Option 3 legislation should include a 
backup rule for cases in which the electors cannot reach a timely consensus. 
5. A Hybrid Approach 
As several of the above "complications" have suggested, the best Sec-
tion 4 legislation might combine two or more of the three main options. For 
instance, Option 1 might be useful as a last-resort backup plan for those 
situations in which neither Option 2 nor 3 can be executed. Option 2 works 
when there is a running mate, but a good law should provide for situations 
when there is not one. Option 3 works best when the dead candidate repre-
sents a well-organized party, but that might not always be the case, and other 
options can cover such a situation. 
Swiftness and certainty would be among the most important character-
istics of an optimal contingent-election system. In a contingent-election sce-
nario, the nation would already be faced with a truncated transition period 
for the new administration, with all the ill effects that entails. 171 Compressing 
the transition period by ten weeks (or more) is bad, but filling those ten 
weeks with wrenching uncertainty would be damaging and potentially dan-
gerous for the country. A contingent election would present enough uncer-
tainty as it is. Adding a candidate death would be even more challenging, 
and having an unclear replacement process would be still worse. The option 
of having the Electoral College reconvene scores poorly on these criteria as 
well. 
Swiftness is easier to provide than certainty. Options 1 and 2 take no 
time at all. Option 3 would take time, but Section 4 legislation using Option 
3 could place an outer time limit on it and specify a backup rule when that 
time limit is missed. Reconvening the Electoral College would take the long-
est of all. 
Certainty is a trickier proposition, because it requires that the Section 4 
law cover whatever circumstances have arisen. This requires some planning; 
certainty would bring some level of complexity with it, but complexity 
would be a price worth paying. It is impossible for Congress to think of 
every possible wrinkle in advance, let alone to cram perfect solutions for all 
of them into a single piece of legislation. Still, Congress should do the best 
that it can and should not be afraid of cramming in solutions for at least 
some of the problems that it considers likeliest to occur. 172 
171 See generally Tevi Troy, Measuring the Drapes, N1\T'L AFF., Spring 2013, at 86 (dis-
cussing problems with too-short presidential transitions, and recent reforms adopted to address 
those problems). 
172 Cf Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 FoRDHAM L. REV. 959, 1003--05 (2010) (noting crucially helpful 
decision of Twenty-Fifth Amendment's proponents not to try to provide for every eventuality). 
142 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 54 
F. Proposed Legislation 
Taking into account all of the considerations discussed above, this Sec-
tion proposes specific language for a Section 4 law. It does not contain the 
legislative language associated with codification, but presumably the bill 
would be codified in Title 3, Chapter 1 of the U.S. Code. m 
Section 2 of the bill chooses Option 2 as the first choice for contingent 
presidential elections, with Option 3 and Option 1 as backstops when there is 
no running mate. As discussed above, Option 2 takes the role of running 
mate more seriously than Option 3 does, and it provides a much faster (in-
deed, instantaneous) and more certain result. It also avoids the problems that 
reconvening the Electoral College would entail. 174 
For contingent vice-presidential elections, Section 3 of the bill chooses 
Option 3, with Option 1 as a backstop, for the reasons discussed above. 175 
Section 3 also gives electors a choice, when a running mate steps into the 
contingent presidential election, of how to handle the running mate's candi-
dacy in the contingent vice-presidential election. If the electors choose, they 
can replace such a vice-presidential candidate with a new one. 
Under Section 4 of the bill, when electors have a choice, they would 
have a 72-hour time limit to make it, though that clock would not start tick-
ing until 72 hours before Congress is scheduled to convene to count the 
electoral votes. Section 4 also specifies that the electors' choice requires only 
a majority and it provides for rapid transmission of their choices to the 
Capitol. 
Section 5 of the bill defines some terms. In doing so, it requires a legal 
declaration of death before a candidate is considered "deceased." It also 
eliminates absent electors from the denominator, and it clarifies what to do 
when a candidate has multiple running mates. 
*** 
A BILL 
To provide for the case of a candidate's death in a contingent presiden-
tial or vice-presidential election. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE 
This Act may be cited as the "Twentieth Amendment Section Four Im-
plementation Act". 
173 See 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-21 (2012) (covering presidential elections and vacancies). 
174 See supra Sections 111.C.2-4. 
175 See supra Section 111.D. 
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SEC. 2. REPLACEMENT OF A CONTINGENT PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE 
(a) In the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House 
of Representatives may choose in a contingent presidential election, the 
House of Representatives shall consider the deceased candidate's running 
mate to be the deceased candidate's replacement as an eligible candidate for 
purposes of choosing a President. 
(b) If the deceased candidate's running mate is also deceased, or if the 
deceased candidate has no running mate, the House of Representatives shall 
consider a candidate designated by the deceased candidate's electors to be 
the deceased candidate's replacement as an eligible candidate for purposes of 
choosing a President, provided that the designation has complied with Sec-
tion 4 of this Act. 
(c) If a replacement candidate is not named as provided in Subsection 
(a) or Subsection (b), the House of Representatives shall consider the de-
ceased candidate to be an eligible candidate in the contingent presidential 
election. If the deceased candidate wins the contingent presidential election, 
he or she shall be considered as a President-elect who has died. 
SEC. 3. REPLACEMENT OF A CONTINGENT VICE-PRESI-
DENTIAL CANDIDATE 
(a) In the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate 
may choose in a contingent vice-presidential election, the Senate shall con-
sider a candidate designated by the deceased candidate's electors to be the 
candidate's replacement as an eligible candidate for purposes of choosing a 
Vice President, provided that the designation has complied with Section 4 of 
this Act. 
(b) If a replacement candidate is not named as provided in Subsection 
(a), the Senate shall treat the deceased candidate to be an eligible candidate 
in the contingent vice-presidential election. If the deceased candidate wins 
the contingent vice-presidential election, he or she shall be considered as a 
Vice-President-elect who has died. 
( c) In the case of the replacement of a deceased presidential candidate 
by his or her running mate as provided in Section 2 of this Act, if the run-
ning mate is simultaneously a candidate in a contingent vice-presidential 
election, the vice-presidential candidate's electors may choose to designate a 
candidate to replace the running mate in the contingent vice-presidential 
election. The Senate shall consider any candidate so designated to be the 
running mate's replacement as an eligible candidate for purposes of choosing 
a Vice President, provided that the designation has complied with Section 4 
of this Act. 
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SEC. 4. PROCESS FOR REPLACEMENT OF CANDIDATES BY 
ELECTORS 
(a) For a deceased candidate's electors to designate a replacement can-
didate in a contingent presidential election or contingent vice-presidential 
election under this Act, the designation must-
(1) be made either within 72 hours after the deceased candidate's death, 
or by the day and time prescribed by law for Congress to count the electoral 
votes, whichever time is later; and 
(2) represent the choice of at least a simple majority of the deceased 
candidate's electors. 
(b) The deceased candidate's electors shall register their individual 
choices in the form "My choice to replace [deceased candidate] is [replace-
ment candidate]" and send them via electronic mail, facsimile, or United 
States Postal Service, to the Clerk of the House of Representatives (for con-
tingent presidential elections) or Secretary of the Senate (for contingent 
vice-presidential elections). For purposes of Subsection (a), an elector's des-
ignation will be considered to have been made at the time it is received by 
the designated officer. 
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS 
When used in this Act: 
(a) The term "contingent presidential election" means the process in 
the House of Representatives for choosing a President after the right of 
choice has devolved upon the House of Representatives as provided in the 
twelfth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
(b) The term "contingent vice-presidential election" means the process 
in the Senate for choosing a Vice President after the right of choice has 
devolved upon the Senate as provided in the twelfth article of amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
(c) The term "deceased candidate" means a person who: 
(1) has received enough electoral votes to be a candidate in either a 
contingent presidential election or contingent vice-presidential election; and 
(2) has been declared dead by a legally qualified authority. 
(d) The term "deceased candidate's elector" means a person who: 
(1) cast an electoral vote for the deceased candidate in the current elec-
tion; and 
(2) remains competent to communicate his or her choice of a replace-
ment candidate. 
(e) (1) The term "running mate" means the person who receives votes 
for the office of Vice President from the same electors as the candidate for 
the office of President whose running mate he or she is. 
(2) If a presidential candidate has more than one running mate under 
this definition, then the one with the highest number of electoral votes from 
the presidential candidate's electors shall be considered the presidential can-
didate's running mate. 
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(3) If a presidential candidate has more than one running mate under 
the definition in subsection (2), then the one who received the highest total 
number of popular votes in the current election on the presidential candi-
date's ticket, in those states in which the presidential candidate received any 
electoral votes, shall be considered the presidential candidate's running mate. 
*** 
IV. EXPLAINING CONGRESS 's FECKLESSNESS 
Throughout the preceding discussion, a question has lurked in the back-
ground: why has Congress never passed a Section 4 law, or even really 
tried? This part of the Article will briefly address that question. 
It is no secret that Congress is not known for passing proactive legisla-
tion in response to remote, potential problems, especially when there are no 
powerful constituencies pushing for it, or elections to be won by passing 
it. 176 Section 4' s lack of legislation certainly represents a fine example of this 
phenomenon. Without any sort of precipitating event to bring candidate 
deaths and contingent elections to the forefront of American political con-
sciousness, Section 4 has never been able to rise to the top of the agenda 
above countless other, more immediate issues. 
The Twentieth Amendment passed Congress in March 1932, and was 
ratified by the requisite number of states in January 1933. 177 But Section 4 
had emerged from a House committee several years earlier, in 1926; the 
energy that generated it had dissipated by the time the amendment passed. 
The House did not pass a version of the amendment until 1931, and while 
the Senate passed a version of the amendment every session from 1923 to 
1932, it was only in 1932, with final passage after a conference committee, 
that it considered a version with anything like Section 4 in it. 178 
In 1926, moreover, there was more reason to think about contingent 
elections than there was afterward. Senator Robert La Folette had run a rela-
tively strong third-party campaign against President Coolidge and Demo-
cratic nominee John W. Davis in 1924, winning 17% of the popular vote and 
13 electoral votes. 179 The election itself was not close; President Coolidge 
was elected by a landslide, and would have won even if all of La Follette's 
176 Cf Goldstein, supra note 172, at 998-1013 (exploring factors that led to the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment's successful passage through Congress); Tribe & Rollins, supra note 35, at 
61 ("[E]xperience counsels caution in changing the Constitution's fundamental design, moved 
by what are at worst hypothetical fears and contingent anxieties."). 
177 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
178 See supra Section 11.C. 
179 See 1924 Presidential General Election Results, DAVE LrnP's ATLAS OF U.S. P1rnsrnEN-
TIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year= 1924 [https://perrna 
.cc/B9KT-D5ZE]; Hearings on H.J. Res. 65, supra note 70, at 1-2 (statement of William Tyler 
Page, Clerk of the House of Reps.) (describing inspiration provided by the Election of 1924 for 
addressing constitutional deficiencies in the contingent-election process). 
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and Davis's votes had been combined under one candidate. 180 But the fact 
that a third-party candidate had attracted even that much support raised the 
specter of a presidential election being thrown into the House in a way that 
the Elections of 1928 and 1932 did not. In the few discussions of Section 4 
in the legislative history, La Follette (who was ill in 1924 and died in June 
1925) and his candidacy feature prominently. 181 Similarly, the three-way 
Election of 1912 was a more recent memory in 1926 than in 1932. 182 By 
1932, the two-party system was back in full swing. 183 The prospect of a con-
tingent election, never prominent, had faded further away. 
In addition, Section 4 was always a peripheral part of the Twentieth 
Amendment, whose main focus is reflected in its popular name: the "Lame 
Duck Amendment." 184 As the amendment was debated, the lame-duck provi-
sions received the most attention by far. 185 When Section 4 came up for 
actual discussion, the comments about it were generally favorable-some-
times very much so-but they were few and very far between. 186 
When the amendment was finally ratified, it was in the midst of one of 
the best arguments in American history for a lame-duck amendment. After 
Franklin Roosevelt was elected President in November 1932, the long transi-
tion period was filled with panic and chaos before Roosevelt and the new 
180 See 1924 Presidential General Election Data-National, DAVE LEIP's ATLAS OF U.S. 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/data.php?year= 1924&datatype 
=national&def= 1 [https://perma.cc/AAR3-SG8X]. 
181 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
183 There were no significant third-party candidacies in 1928 or 1932. They occurred only 
sporadically after that, in 1948 (when Strom Thurrnond won 39 electoral votes in the South), 
1968 (when George Wallace won 46 electoral votes in the South), and 1992 and 1996 (when 
Ross Perot won 19% and 8% of the popular vote, respectively). See 1948 Presidential General 
Election Results, DAVE LEIP's ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas 
.org/RESULTS/national.php?year= 1948 [https://perma.cc/S5QA-LMEV]; 1968 Presidential 
General Election Results, DAVE LEI1>'s ATl"As OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselec-
tionatlas.org/RESUL TS/national.php?year= 1968 [https://perma.cc/532W-WG94]; 1992 Pres-
idential General Election Results, supra note 164; 1996 Presidential General Election Results, 
DAVE LEIP's ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ 
national.php?year= 1996 [https://perrna.cc/XRE8-DG63]. In 1960, non-candidate Harry Byrd 
won fifteen electoral votes. See 1960 Presidential General Election Results, supra note 170. 
184 See, e.g., JOHN R. VrLE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND hs 
AMENDMENTS 213 (2015); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
428-30 (2005). 
185 This is a characterization of the content of the thorough legislative history compiled by 
ProQuest Legislative Insight. 
186 See, e.g., 69 CONG. REC. 4418 (statement of Rep. Vinson) (noting lack of opposition to 
Section 4); id. at 4206 (statement of Rep. Lozier) (referring to Section 4 as "exceedingly 
wholesome"). Several statements even suggested, perhaps hyperbolically, that the non-lame-
duck portions of the amendment were more valuable than the lame-duck portions. See, e.g., 74 
CONG. REC. 5887 (1931) (statement of Rep. Lozier); id. at 4370 (statement of Rep. Chind-
blom); id. at 4220 (statement of Rep. Mapes). For examples of the more typical statements 
about the amendment that accord Section 4 its usual low priority, see 75 CONG. REc. 5085 
(statement of Sen. Norris); id. at 3880-81 (1932) (statement of Rep. Gibson). 
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Congress came to power in March 1933. 187 Had the amendment been ratified 
a year earlier, the wait would have been only until January, and Roosevelt 
would not have needed to call a special session of Congress. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that most of the states that ratified the Twentieth Amendment 
did so between Roosevelt's election and his inauguration. 188 
To the extent that the amendment excited the popular imagination and 
its political representation in Congress, it was in favor of the notion of 
swifter, more responsive government. With the New Deal Congress produc-
ing a flurry of legislation to deal with the Great Depression, contingent-
election arcana could not have been much further out of mind. 189 The Great 
Depression continued its hold on the national agenda for many years, and 
then was replaced by the similarly absorbing World War II and Cold War. 
The energy that motivated the House committee to write Section 4 in 1926 
faded still further into the background, never to be recaptured. 
Significantly, this failure influenced Congress the next time it turned to 
consider a proactive constitutional amendment concerning the presidency. 
When the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's presidential disability provisions were 
being debated, there were multiple theories of the best way to proceed. Some 
people proposed that, rather than try to agree on a specific procedure, the 
amendment should just empower Congress to pass legislation to do so. The 
amendment's sponsor, Birch Bayh, rejected this idea, noting that the Twenti-
eth Amendment had tried such an approach, and no legislation had ever 
passed. Better, he said, to write in specifics rather than put the task off to 
some later time, by which point "interest may have waned."190 
Another characteristic of Section 4 legislation cuts both ways. Because 
Section 4 legislation offers no payoff for any particular political players or 
interest groups, there is necessarily a shortage of legislative leaders moti-
187 See Kyvig, supra note 55, at 368 (noting juxtaposition of ratification and awful 1933 
lame-duck period). 
188 See id. at 367 (describing timing of states' ratification). Seventeen states ratified the 
amendment before the Election of 1932. The remaining nineteen needed for ratification did so 
between the election and the inauguration (along with ten more states that ratified the amend-
ment after that, for good measure). Two more ratified the amendment after Roosevelt's inaugu-
ration. To be sure, it surely also mattered that many state legislatures did not convene until 
early January, and thus between the election and presidential inauguration. 
Interestingly, President-elect Roosevelt was nearly assassinated during that period; Section 
3 of the Twentieth Amendment, ratified just twenty-three days earlier, would have provided for 
the smooth elevation of Vice President-elect John Nance Gamer, and would not have required 
any legislative action to do so. 
189 Indeed, there were those who objected to passing the Twentieth Amendment at all 
given the pressing matter of the Great Depression. As one intemperate (if colorful) representa-
tive put it: "Why, the Congress of the United States, with 8,000,000 of our citizens unem-
ployed and hungry, should devote two whole days-and maybe more-of its time to 
considering this particular constitutional amendment is beyond my conception .... We should 
not waste our valuable time with a measure such as this-conceived by crackaloos, propagated 
by crackpots, and supported by thoughtless demagogues." 75 CONG. REC. 3827 (1932) (state-
ment of Rep. O'Connor). 
190 111 CONG. REC. 3271 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
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vated to pick up the Section 4 banner and run with it. But if and when some 
precipitating event piques enough interest in Section 4 to spur the introduc-
tion of legislation, the fact that it would not face any particular partisan 
opposition, or disturb any interbranch sensitivities-no one would have any 
particular axe to grind against it, in other words-would help proposals 
move through the legislative process more easily. 
A final characteristic of Section 4 would make legislation more difficult 
to pass, and consequently less likely to be introduced in the first place. As 
Part II of this Article should have demonstrated, there is no single obvious, 
universally appealing design for Section 4 legislation. Indeed, if there were, 
it would make more sense for Congress to conserve its energy and wait to 
pass such easy legislation only if and when a candidate in a contingent elec-
tion died. All other things being equal, the more competing legislative solu-
tions there are to a problem, the harder it will be to build consensus. The 
harder it will be to build consensus, the less incentive Congress has to ex-
pend its limited resources on the exercise. 
v. CONCLUSION 
It would be nai've simply to recommend that, because it would be sen-
sible to debate and pass Section 4 legislation before it is needed, Congress 
should do so promptly. Perhaps there will come a day, though, when the 
country's attention is drawn to contingent elections or candidate deaths-
ideally because of a near miss rather than an actual disaster like the one that 
opened this Article. Alternatively, in the midst of an election season in 
which deadlock and contingent elections look like a real possibility, but 
before the results are set in November, Congress could finally notice the 
problem here. It might then be moved to protect the Republic from the awful 
consequences that would be wrought by a candidate's death-let alone by a 
candidate's assassination. 
If the nation's interest is piqued in any of these ways, Congress might 
respond with a sensible piece of Section 4 legislation, hopefully guided by 
the arguments presented here. Lightning struck in 1926 when Section 4 was 
conceived; maybe it will strike again. 
